

NORWAY

National report on the implementation of

*The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects.*

Oslo April 30
2003

I. Introduction

The Government of Norway holds the view that combating and eradicating illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, is fundamental to improved global, regional and national security as well as necessary social and economic development in many countries. Norway has supported the international co-operation to achieve this goal multilaterally, regionally and bilaterally, with governments as well as Non Governmental Organisations based on the programme of action. The following is a report on the policy and undertakings by the Government of Norway to implement the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

As a member of the UN Security Council in 2001 and 2002 Norway contributed actively to the Council's work to follow up the Conference in 2001 and the agreed plan of action through the adoption of Presidential Statements S/PRST/2001/21 and S/PRST/2002/30.

II. National co-ordination agency

The national co-ordination agency for policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects is:

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Section for global security
P.o. box 8114 Dep.
0032 Oslo
Norway

III. National point of contact

The national point of contact is:

Section for global security
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
P.o. box 8114 Dep.
0032 Oslo
Norway

IV. National legislation, regulations and administrative procedures

1. Note

Norway has no production of weapons defined as SALW in the OSCE document: FSC.DOC/1/00 "OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons".

2. National Marking Systems

2.1 Marks used on SALW

All Norwegian weapons are marked with a serial number placed on the weapon by the manufacturer. These numbers are unique for each weapon and serve as an identification of the weapon for the Norwegian authorities. The manufacturer also marks the individual weapon with the month and year of manufacture in combination with its own emblem or similar symbol. Weapons procured by the armed forces in the late 1960s and early 1970s were also marked with Norway's national coat of arms (AG-3 and MG-3).

However, the marking of weapons with the national coat of arms was criticised, and the question was raised of whether this use of the national coat of arms was appropriate from a heraldic point of view. In all subsequent procurements (Pistol P80, P38 and submachine gun MP5), the lion in the coat of arms has been replaced with the letter N. This marking too is applied by the manufacturer.

The reason why this system of national marking was implemented in Norway is that during the hasty evacuation from Gaza in 1967, we ended up with a mix of Norwegian and Danish Garand rifles. The objective therefore was to make it easier to distinguish Norwegian weapons from the weapons of other countries. The decision to introduce this marking system was taken by the Norwegian Army Ordnance Corps, and, as explained above, it was a response to a practical need to identify weapons quickly. It was not an official order from a higher authority.

In response to the OSCE document, the HQ Defence Command, Norway (FO) ordered the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation, Land, (FLO/L) last year to ensure that all weapons procured by the Norwegian armed forces in the future are marked with unique identification markings. This order also applied, as far as it was possible to implement, to weapons already in the possession of the armed forces.

In practice, this means that weapons procured by the Norwegian armed forces since 1968 and weapons procured in the future are or will be marked in accordance with the OSCE document on SALW.

2.2 Techniques for marking

Depending on the weapon's design, all markings are either stamped or engraved into the metal in an easily visible place. Stamping is the preferred method as it causes detectable structural changes within the metal, making it possible to identify numbers and symbols even after limited attempts (e.g. by filing) have been made to remove them.

It is more cost-effective to let the manufacturer do the marking than to carry out the process in Norway.

2.3 State policies in marking unmarked weapons

As pointed out in 2.1, weapons were not marked with the national coat of arms until 1968-69. The Norwegian armed forces still have some weapons from the time before this marking was introduced. However, these weapons are not expected to be used in live operations. These weapons carry manufacturer markings and serial numbers, which constitute unique identifiers. It could, however, require more time to identify such weapons if they are found outside Norway.

At the moment there are no plans for further marking of these weapons.

2.4 National authority in charge of marking

FLO/LAND and the National Police Directorate are responsible for issuing provisions for marking of weapons in the Norwegian armed forces and the Police respectively. They decide where and how (engraving or stamping) the weapons are to be marked.

2.5 State control over private sector regarding marking

There is no national production of SALW.

2.6 State laws or practices on licensed production outside of the national territory

There is no licensed production of SALW outside Norway.

2.7 Information on the means for tracing weapons, and/or details on record keeping

At present, the Police and each of the three branches of the Norwegian armed forces have their own computerised system for keeping records on weapons. However, a joint system for the branches of the Armed Forces is being developed in connection with the merging of the three branches' materiel commands. The current systems contain, and the joint system will contain, lists of the serial numbers of each weapon, the unit that has the weapon in its keeping, and where appropriate, the name of the person to whom the weapon has been issued. Status indication "på lager" – "tapt" – "utlevert" – "destruert" [*Nor. "in storage/lost/issued/destroyed"*] are/will also be listed. For reasons of security (theft), access to these systems is restricted to a limited number of persons.

Access to records will be provided in cases of police investigation.

3. National procedures for the control over manufacture

3.1 Procedures for the issuance of licenses and authorisations

Purchase, acquisition, import and manufacture of SALW require permission from the police. Permission is granted upon application if the applicant satisfies requirements regarding conduct, professional competence, security and storage.

3.2 Review and renewal of licenses

Licences are normally issued without an end date.

3.3 Procedures for revocation of licenses

If manufacture at any stage does not comply with the conditions contained in the license or have been convicted for a serious crime, the license could be revoked.

3.4 Prosecution/penalisation of illicit manufacture

For illicit manufacture a penalty may be imposed of fines or imprisonment for up to four years.

4. National legislation and export control policies

4.1 Common export control criteria and other international commitments

Norway controls the export of small arms and light weapons on the basis of national legislation for armament, equipment and technology. Strict export control practice is implemented, taking into account international security, stability and non-proliferation concerns. In the decision making process, foreign and domestic assessments are carefully examined. Norway will not permit sale of arms and munitions to areas where there is an ongoing war, where war is imminent or to countries where there is a civil war going on.

Norway follows the criteria and principles of the EU Code of Conduct, the UN Register on Conventional Arms Transfers, The Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and various regional initiatives.

4.2 Types of licenses

An individual licence, issued by the licensing authority, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, authorises the export of one or several pieces to one recipient upon application. Collective licences are not issued for defence related exports.

4.3 Period of validity, revocation and exceptions

The period of validity for licenses for SALW is normally up to three months. Licenses for temporary export are issued in cases of repairs, demonstrations and exhibition purposes.

Licenses are not required when SALW are used by national contingents participating in peacekeeping operations and military training exercises. Private persons on temporary travel with legally owned weapons are exempted from the license requirements.

An export licence granted pursuant to the regulations may be revoked if the licence holder to a considerable extent misuses the licence or to a considerable extent fails to fulfil the terms specified therein. A licence may also be revoked if new facts or changes in the facts become known, or the political situation in the recipient state or area changes, so that the basis on which permission was granted is significantly altered. The general rules concerning the reversal of individual decisions also apply.

No licences are issued to embargoed destinations or areas of concern.

4.4 End-use, verification and re-transfer

EUCs, ICCs or some other official authorisation issued by the receiving state is required.

Verification can be carried out when there is reason to suspect a violation of export control rules.

In certain cases, re-transfer is restricted by a specific clause in the EUC.

4.5 Assistance

Bilateral talks and co-operation between different foreign authorities such as export control officials, customs officials, etc. serve as provisions of assistance for other states regarding export controls.

4.6 Law enforcement and penalties

Act of 18 December 1987 relating to control of the export of strategic goods, services, technology, etc. is basis for the control on exports of these goods.

The Act prohibits persons resident or staying in Norway and Norwegian companies, foundations and associations from trading, negotiating or otherwise assisting in the sale of arms and defence materiel from one foreign country to another without special permission.

”Unless the matter is subject to a more severe penalty otherwise provided by statute, a penalty may be imposed of fines or imprisonment for up to five years, or both.”

5. Arms brokering

5.1 Registration of international brokers working on State territory

The legal basis for Norway’s control of arms brokering is the Export Control Act of 18 December 1987 and the Regulations of 10 January 1989 relating to the implementation of the export of strategic goods, services and technology, Section 1 h:

”It is not permitted for persons who are domiciled or resident in Norway and Norwegian companies, foundations and associations to engage in trade in, negotiate or by other means assist in the sale of the military products included in List 1 (national military list) from one foreign country to another without the consent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”

5.2 Registration of international brokers who are State nationals, wherever located

Norway has no legal registration requirement for brokers. However, when a broker applies for a permission to execute a brokering activity, he will automatically be registered.

The legislation states that arms brokering is not permitted for persons who are domiciled or resident in Norway and Norwegian companies, foundations and associations without a permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A person who is domiciled or resident needs permission from the Norwegian authorities to carry out arms brokering activity, regardless of which country he operates from. There are no other requirements linked to extra-territoriality in the Norwegian legislation.

5.3 Licenses/authorisations for international brokering transactions

Applications for permission to execute arms brokering activity are to be submitted in the form of a letter. Authorisation will also be given in the form of a letter.

An export licence/permission granted pursuant to the regulations may be revoked if the licence holder to a considerable extent misuses the licence or to a considerable extent fails to fulfil the terms specified therein. A licence may also be revoked if new facts or changes in the

facts become known, or the political situation in the recipient state or area changes, so that the basis on which permission was granted is substantially altered. The general rules concerning the reversal of individual decisions also apply.

5.4 Reporting requirement for licensed international brokers?

Reporting of all activities regarding arms exports and arms brokering are subject to quarterly reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

5.5 Exporter required to disclose brokers involved in transaction

Pursuant to the regulations, the exporter is obliged to furnish any information or documentation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deems necessary for the processing of the application. However, there is no specific requirement for exporters to disclose information on brokers involved in a transaction.

5.6 Penalties for illegal international brokering activities and law enforcement

The legal basis for enforcement is the Export Control Act of 18 December 1987.

Unless the matter is subject to a more severe penalty otherwise provided by statute, a penalty may be imposed of fines or imprisonment for up to five years, or both, when a person wilfully:

1. exports or attempts to export goods, technology or services in contravention of this Act or regulations issued pursuant thereto, or
2. violates or attempts to violate any condition laid down pursuant to this Act, or
3. orally or in writing furnishes erroneous information concerning conditions of significance for the permission to export goods, technology or services when this information is furnished:
 - a. in a declaration made for use by a public official or anyone acting on behalf of a public official in connection with export or an application for permission to export,
 - b. in a declaration which shall enable another person to make such a declaration as is mentioned under litra a, or
4. in any other way contravenes or attempts to contravene provisions issued pursuant to this Act.

Complicity in any offence as mentioned in the first paragraph is subject to the same penalty.

An offence of negligence as mentioned in the first paragraph, or complicity therein, shall be punished by fines or imprisonment for up to two years.

If a punishable act as mentioned above is committed by any person on behalf of a limited liability company, a limited partnership, or some other association or foundation, a fine may be imposed on the enterprise as such.

When imposing a fine in accordance with the first paragraph, it shall inter alia be taken into account whether the offence was committed for the purpose of promoting the interests of the enterprise or whether the enterprise has benefited from the offence.

The enterprise on whose behalf the perpetrator has acted may be deprived of the right to engage in commercial activities.

Criminal liability in terms of this provision is time-barred after the expiry of ten years.

Further, the Ministry may require confiscation of such account books and documents as must be submitted in accordance with section 2, second paragraph in the Act. If there is reason to believe that account books and documents exist, and if conditions otherwise so indicate, the Ministry may require a search of offices and all other premises which are not a private residence.

A claim for a search or confiscation is to be addressed to the police. As regards the further consideration of the claim, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act apply to the extent to which they are appropriate. The person against whom the claim is made shall be accorded the rights of a party to the suit in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and, to the extent to which it is necessary for the enterprise, shall have access to the confiscated material. He is nevertheless not for that reason to be regarded as charged with a punishable offence. Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Act applies correspondingly. Notwithstanding section 212, first paragraph, of the Criminal Procedure Act, the Court determines which documents etc. the Court shall examine.

6. Techniques and procedures for destruction of small arms

6.1 Techniques for Destruction

As a rule, all weapons are cut into pieces of roughly 25 x 25 mm. This is standard procedure for all weapons types falling within the definition provided in the OSCE document.

6.2 Details on record keeping and/or authority for destruction

Weapons to be destroyed are transported by authorised personnel to the civilian facility that carries out the destruction. A list of all weapons (with serial numbers) in the shipment is drawn up for each shipment. Authorised personnel monitor the destruction process and check the data on the weapons destroyed against the lists issued by the sending authority. The weapons are then labelled “Destroyed” in the central register of weapons.

All weapons remain in the data base(s) until every weapon of a specific type has been destroyed, lost or otherwise disposed of. As far as we know, there are no provisions which require storage of data beyond this. Since World War II, however, this has not been a problem, as the military has retained a few specimens of all relevant weapons types.

Decisions to destroy individual weapons are taken by FLO/LAND and the Police Procurement Service (PPS). Weapons designated for destruction usually display such a degree of wear or damage that it is no longer cost-effective to repair them. Decisions to decommission weapons types are taken by the Headquarters Defence Command.

6.3 Seized or confiscated weapons

All seized/confiscated firearms are required to be delivered to the National Bureau of Crime Investigation (Kripos), which delivers them to the defence establishment for destruction. Kripos keeps back some firearms for its collection of samples, which is used in crime investigations (analysis of clues, etc.)

Kripos registers all firearms received for destruction and keeps records of all the historical data.

There are plans to declare a national amnesty in 2003. The aim is to encourage the registration or handing in of all unregistered firearms in private hands. An offer to deactivate firearms will be made as part of the amnesty. Deactivated firearms, i.e. firearms that are rendered permanently unusable, do not have to be registered.

6.4 Surplus weapons

The Defence Command Norway is authorised to define and identify surplus stocks of SALW and ammunition in the inventory of the Armed Forces, while this authority rests with the PPS regarding weapons and ammunition in use by the Police.

Technological change, changing missions, military reductions could be used as criteria for defining surplus SALW and ammunition held by the military and the police. However, technological changes and military reductions/structural reform are normally used as criteria for defining surplus stocks in the Armed Forces, while end of lifetime and technological changes are the most common reasons for defining surplus stocks in the Police Force.

FLO and PPS are in charge of the disposition of surplus weapons used by the Armed Forces and the Police respectively.

Surplus weapons are registered and stored in accordance with the same rules which applies to ordinary SALW.

6.5 Public destruction and public awareness campaigns

Destruction activities regarding SALW has not been publicly announced in the past. It is not considered a national priority for the time being and no plans for public destruction exist.

Regarding public awareness campaigns, there are plans to declare a national weapon amnesty in 2003. The aim is to encourage the registration or handing in of all unregistered firearms in private hands. An offer to deactivate firearms will be made as part of the amnesty. Deactivated firearms, i.e. firearms that are rendered permanently unusable, do not have to be registered.

6.6 Assistance to/from other States

Assistance to destruction of surplus SALW is a major area for assistance in Norwegian SALW policy. Norway is currently involved in close to 20 international co-operation and assistance programs in the area of SALW. The government spends about USD 2 mill. annually on such programs. In addition to these projects Norway is also involved in a number of peace-building projects where small arms is one of several components (such as the program "Training for Peace" in the SADC area).

The largest projects are government to government agreements between Norway and South Africa on the destruction of surplus and confiscated weapons and ammunition held by the South African Defence Force and by the South African Police Service.

Together with the US, Norway offer to send evaluation teams to countries asking for assistance to review surplus stocks. Such assessment teams have so far been in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania on the invitation of these countries. Norway also contributes to collection and destruction programs in several regions, in particular in the Balkans. Norway has so far also been a main contributor to the UNDP Trust Fund for Small Arms, and is a donor for the current OSCE study of surplus policies in the OSCE area.

V. International co-operation and assistance

Assistance to affected countries and regions is a key priority of Norwegian policy on small arms and light weapons. The main geographical focus of concrete projects and activities supported by Norway is Africa and the Balkans. A substantial part of Norwegian resources is channelled through Norwegian and international NGOs and research institutions and through the UNDP Trust Fund for Small Arms. Current and planned projects/activities include the following:

1. AFRICA

1.1 South Africa

1.1.1

Norway has supported “*Operation Moufflon*” of the South African National Defence Force for the *destruction of 263.000 surplus and redundant weapons* (Agreement Feb. 2000, contribution NOK 525.000). Based on bilateral agreement Norway-South Africa

1.1.2

Similar agreement with govt of South Africa/*South African Police Service* of July 2001 for *the destruction of 85 000 confiscated and official firearms and 8,2 million rounds of ammunition*. Ongoing project with total Norwegian financial commitment of USD 400.000.

1.2 Malawi

1.2.1

A *Security Sector Reform* project on Community Safety, Policing and Firearms Control has been carried out *in Malawi* in the period 1999-2001 financed by the Norwegian Development Assistance Agency (NORAD) and run by Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) and in the final phase by the Norwegian Embassy in Lilongwe in co-operation with Saferworld and Norwegian Church Aid. Total Norwegian financial support ca. 2,3 mill NOK. A follow-on project, “Community Safety and Empowerment Programme for Malawi and the surrounding Countries”, will commence in 2002 and run until 2006. This project is funded by NORAD via the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA).

1.3 Regional: Southern Africa

Norway currently support small arms projects with a regional profile by:

1.3.1

SaferAfrica and its “Programme for promoting human security through assistance to implementation initiatives to reduce the proliferation of illicit SALW”. Support for 2002 : NOK 450.000 (USD 58.000)

1.3.2

Institute for Security Studies; Pretoria: Norway , the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland have sponsored two successive small arms projects by the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria for the period 1996-2001 (The Collaborative Peace Project/TCP and The Implementation Project/TIP). We have recently decided to continue as a sponsor for a larger

follow on project : “The Arms Management Programme 2002-2006”. The yearly financial commitment is approximately USD 200.000. The program focuses on implementation assistance, research, information sharing and building civil-governmental arms control community. Country focus for 2002: Mozambique, DR Congo and South Africa.

1.4 East Africa/Great Lakes/Horn of Africa

1.4.1

Norway contributed economically and technically to the “Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Conference” in Nairobi in March 2000 and belongs to the support group “Friends of Nairobi” for the follow up of the Nairobi declaration.

1.4.2

We have recently decided to support the project “Increasing Human Security through Controlling the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa” by the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), Nairobi. Norwegian support for 2002: NOK 750.000

1.5 West Africa/Mali/UN Regional Centre in LOMÉ

1.5.1

Norway contributed substantially to the establishment of the *ECOWAS moratorium and the PCASED* implementation mechanism in 1998-99. More recently support has been channelled through NISAT. Norway has also supported DD&R programmes and “Flamme de la paix” in *Mali*. At this stage there are no specific programmes for support directly to ECOWAS or PCASED, except a programme organised through *the UN Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Lomé*. Norway is a contributor to the project “Train the Trainers on Small Arms Control, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Africa” which targets the 16 countries in the ECOWAS moratorium. The Norwegian contribution is also geared to DDA/UNREC activities for support to the ECOWAS moratorium and its renewal (Support for 2001: NOK 350.000)

1.6 Africa general

Norway was a sponsor and member of the organising committee for *the “African Conference on the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms: Needs and Partnerships”*, held in Pretoria in March 2002.

2. Europe/OSCE/Nato-EAPC/Balkans

2.1 Albania

Since 1998 Norway has been a major contributor to and actively involved in weapons collection and weapons destruction programmes in the Gramsh and Dibra provinces of Albania. Co-operation partners have been the US and Germany, the UNDP (Weapons for development program), the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and Norwegian Peoples Aid

2.1.1

A Partnership for Peace Trust Fund has recently been set up for destruction of seized and surplus ammunition in Albania. Canada acts as lead country. Norway decided in February 2002 to contribute USD 100.000 to the Trust Fund for 2002. The project is still in its fundraising phase

2.2 Kosovo

Norway supported a Weapons destruction in Kosovo through NATO (USD 50.000 in 2000/2001)

2.3 Romania, Bulgaria and Macedonia

In 2002 (Romania) and 2000 (Bulgaria and Macedonia) a team of Norwegian and US experts have been invited to these countries to assist in evaluating stockpile management and surplus stocks of SALW. These visits have been organised in the framework of the US-Norwegian Small Arms Working Group (ref. below). As a follow up to the report of the Romania team a destruction project for Romania's surplus small arms and ammunition is now being organised. The US, Norway and the UK are so far the partners in this project.

2.4 Yugoslavia

The Red Cross of Yugoslavia has initiated a campaign to reduce demand for weapons and prepare the ground for reduction through a collection campaign. This project is done in co-operation with the Norwegian Red Cross/NISAT and is financed by the Norwegian government (approximately NOK 460.000). It may be developed into a regional program which includes also Macedonia and Bosnia)

2.5 Small Arms Survey/UNIDIR

2.5.1

Norway is a member of the International Programme Council of the Small Arms Survey and contributes annually to the Survey, including the publication of its handbook. The contribution in 2001 was CHF 130.000.

2.5.2

Norway has asked the Small Arms Survey and UNIDIR to carry out an evaluation of South Africa's national destruction programme (which Norway has financed to a large degree) and will bear the costs of that evaluation (USD 76.150) which is being done together with the Small Arms Survey.

2.6 BICC

The Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) in partnership with the Small Arms Survey, Saferworld and BASIC, has initiated a comparative *survey/study of policies and policy options concerning the disposal of surplus stocks of SALW in the member states of the OSCE*. Norway has supported a prestudy of this project (USD 10.000), which is now underway in 9 OSCE countries including Norway.

3. Latin America

3.1

Support to small arms projects by the UN Regional Centre in Lima
Norway contributes to the implementation of the PoA in Latin America through support to DDA/UN Regional Centre in Latin America. Projects recently supported include “Train the Trainers course” and regional awareness building workshops. (Support in 2001 NOK 190.000)

4. ASIA

4.1 Afghanistan

Afghanistan represents the first major post-conflict situation after the adoption of the PoA. Norway believes that the SALW challenges in the country need to be addressed in an appropriate way as part of the broader efforts in the country and in close collaboration with SRSB Brahimi and the Interim Authority. We are in contact with the UNDP, which is planning action in the area. Norway has indicated to the UNDP that we are ready to finance a pre-project on SALW action in Afghanistan, but so far no agreement has been signed

5 UNDP/UNDP Trust Fund for Small Arms

The UNDP Trust Fund for Small Arms was established in 1998 on the initiative of the Prime Minister of Norway. Norway has so far been the major contributor to the Fund (NOK 15 million contributed so far). Projects have been or are being carried out in Albania, Republic of Congo, Solomon Islands, El Salvador, Kosovo, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Eastern Europe, as well as several projects with a global approach. We support the “Weapons and Development” profile of the UNDP’s Global Programme on Weapons Collection, Management and Destruction (WMCD)

6. Co-operation with civil society and NGO’s

6.1

The *Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT)* was established in 1997. It is a joint effort between the Norwegian Red Cross, the Norwegian Church Aid, and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. Since its beginning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided annual funding of NISAT’s projects and activities (annual support between NOK 2,5 and 3,0 million)

6.2

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

NUPI runs several broader training and security sector reform programmes with main focus on Africa and the Balkans. Small arms is an important element in these programmes which are financed by the MFA/NORAD and include:

6.2.1

“Training for Peace” in Southern Africa, a multi-year programme which aims at training the trainers in the countries of the SADC area. The programme has recently been evaluated and renewed for a new five year period. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has under consideration a similar programme for West Africa. The Training for Peace program is financed by the Norwegian Development Assistance Agency (NORAD)

6.2.1

NUPI also runs security sector reform programs in Africa and the Balkans financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

VII Dutch Norwegian initiative on further steps to enhance international co-operation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons.

On April 22-24 2003 the Netherlands and Norway in co-operation hosted an international meeting with global attendance regarding illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons. The chairs summary of the conference, which will be a joint statement from the Netherlands and Norway will at a later stage be submitted as an annex to this report.

VIII Regional co-operation

1. OSCE

1.1 General

Norway is a participating State in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), the body of the OSCE that developed the OSCE SALW Document and continues to be the caretaker of it.

Norway has taken an active role in the current FSC development of OSCE Best Practice Guides on eight different areas related to the control of SALW. Norway also supports various FSC-sponsored regional SALW activities within the OSCE area.

1.2 OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW

In May 2003 Germany and Norway will in co-operation submit to the OSCE a proposal for a "Best Practice Guide on National Control of Brokering activities". The proposal will be submitted as an annex to this report at a later stage.

IX FUTURE ACTIVITIES AND ACTIONS

The United Nations and all member states should vigorously pursue the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat And Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

Based on the national reports submitted to the First Biennial Meeting of States to consider the implementation of the programme of action, the Secretary General should make a summary and submit recommendations for future actions by the UN, by regional organisations and by member states. Special efforts should be made to assist countries that have not been in a position to submit national reports with the financial capacity resources, such as they might request.

International co-operation is crucial with regard to combating illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Special attention should therefore also be given to the development of regional co-operation on these matters, such as the co-operation being developed in the OSCE, AU, SADC, ECOWAS, OAS and other regional organisations.

In future co-operation to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, the links and co-ordination with the global efforts to combat global poverty, terrorism and organised crime, should be strengthened.

Norway will continue to support the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat And Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, with political, financial, and capacity building support to global, regional and bilateral efforts and projects.