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The Flow of Small Arms and Explosives to Terrorist Groups: EU Challenges and Remedies

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NOTE

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SUMMARY

While most small arms and light weapons (SALW) are not of primary interest to terrorists, it would be prudent for counter-terrorism agencies to focus sharply on small arms suppliers as a means of interdicting weapons capable of shooting down aircraft or destroying mass transit vehicles. Al-Qaeda has insinuated itself into terrorist insurgencies operating on Europe's periphery that heavily employ SALW. The most prominent is the Chechen separatist insurgency against Russia, which is also believed to be a source of bomb-making talent to al-Qaeda and its dispersed Islamist affiliates. Accordingly, tracing arms routes into and out of Chechnya (and other areas of armed activity in the region, like Georgia) could have an impact on the vitality of an important al-Qaeda affiliate. In addition, there may be limited potential for some al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups to adopt more conventional insurgency tactics for which SALW might be appropriate. Such considerations suggest that SALW, from a counter-terrorism point of view, merit greater political and administrative attention than they are so far receiving.

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THE FLOW OF SMALL ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES TO TERRORIST GROUPS: EU CHALLENGES AND REMEDIES

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OVERVIEW

During most of the Cold War, Europe's terrorism challenges were largely domestic as opposed to international or transnational. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and high explosives, such as Semtex and C-4, composed the arsenals of active and dangerous ideological and ethno-nationalist terrorist groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the United Kingdom, the Basque separatist *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA) in Spain, the left-wing Red Brigades in Italy and the Marxist Baader-Meinhof Gang/Red Army Faction in West Germany. The weapons and explosives were of roughly equal utility in low intensity, primarily urban campaigns in which terrorists kept violence relatively constrained and selective—increasingly targeting security forces rather than the general population—with an eye toward forcing political compromise. Furthermore, the weapons came primarily from outside Europe. For example, a lion's share of the IRA's arsenal during the latter part of its campaign came from a shipment from Libya in 1983.

The post-Cold War scene was different, the post-11 September 2001 scene more different still. The release of former Iron Curtain countries from Soviet control and the shrinkage of their armies resulted in a surplus of SALW and explosives, and a flourishing illicit arms market. In the late 1990s, for instance, both republican and pro-British "loyalist" terrorist groups in Northern Ireland obtained significant quantities of small arms from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Croatia. At the same time, however, the intensity of the essentially domestic terrorist efforts in Europe was waning. The Baader-Meinhof Gang and Red Army Faction had disintegrated by the late 1980s. Italian counter-terrorism efforts had virtually neutralized the Red Brigades by the early 1990s. The IRA and UK government had established a sustainable (albeit very fragile) political accommodation. And ETA—though unsatisfied with political developments during a 14-month ceasefire in 1998–1999—lost popular support and ratcheted down its level of violence. Furthermore, the production of SALW became highly decentralized: as of 2004, nearly 1,250 companies operating in some 92 countries made weapons, components or ammunition.¹

After al-Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, it became clear that the United States, by virtue of being the principal Western power, Saudi Arabia's strategic partner and Israel's main ally, faced a potentially strategic mass casualty terrorist threat from an Islamist terrorist network that had recruited for, planned and staged its most audacious and destructive operation from Europe. As US homeland security improved, Europe loomed as a more attractive direct target owing to its cultural and political similarities and its strategic partnership with the United States, as well as its large and substantially disaffected indigenous Muslim population and its geographical proximity to the Gulf and North Africa. That potential became a stark reality when Islamist terrorists struck Madrid on 11 March 2004, killing 192 people.

With respect to transnational Islamist terrorists, SALW were not the primary concern: strafing police or army patrols with machine guns or crew-served weapons was unlikely to kill a sufficient number of people to render such operations attractive to terrorists with apparently more apocalyptic mindsets. Osama bin Laden's public statements and intelligence gleaned from Afghanistan following the US-led intervention there demonstrated that these "new" terrorists were interested in acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or at least those of mass disruption, such as radiological dispersion devices ("dirty bombs"). Until they could do so, conventional explosives emplaced so as to maximize casualties—as in Indonesia (Bali), Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey as well as Spain—were evidently the weapon of choice. In addition, an attempt to down an Israeli jetliner in Mombassa, Kenya, in November 2002 revealed the inclination of Islamist terrorists to use light weapons with mass-casualty capability, namely man portable air defence missiles (MANPADS), also known as surface-to-air missiles (or SAMs).² Such a missile was also fired at a DHL cargo plane departing Baghdad's airport in November 2004, disabling its hydraulic system and forcing it to land. It stands to reason that other light weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades (RPCs)—one of which may have downed a civilian helicopter in Iraq—could be of use to terrorists for closer-in targeting of airplanes and helicopters as well as ground public transportation vehicles and stationary installations like embassy buildings.³

Thus, the first priority for European national governments and the European Union itself would logically be to track and interdict shipments of high explosives and WMD-related material. Yet, while most SALW are not of primary interest to terrorists, it would be prudent for counter-terrorism agencies to focus sharply on small arms suppliers as a means of interdicting MANPADS and other light weapons capable of shooting down aircraft or destroying mass transit vehicles. Furthermore, al-Qaeda has insinuated itself into terrorist insurgencies operating on Europe's periphery that *do* heavily employ SALW. The most prominent is the Chechen separatist insurgency against Russia, which is also believed to be a source of bomb-making talent to al-Qaeda and its dispersed Islamist affiliates. Accordingly, tracing arms routes into and out of Chechnya (and other areas of armed activity in the region, like Georgia) could have an impact on the vitality of an important al-Qaeda affiliate. In addition, there may be limited potential for some al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups to adopt more conventional insurgency tactics for which SALW might be appropriate. Such considerations suggest that SALW, from a counter-terrorism point of view, merit greater political and administrative attention than they are so far receiving.

EU COUNTER-TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTION ON SALW AND EXPLOSIVES

While threat perceptions with respect to terrorist use of WMD are increasing in some European countries, the prevailing view is that even transnational Islamist terrorists with non-negotiable objectives will tend to use (if only by default) conventional explosives aimed at maximizing casualties.⁴ The US-led Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) scheme in Russia for destroying or otherwise securing nuclear weapons-related material and equipment and re-employing Russian scientists has been effective, and has been predictably expanded since 11 September 2001. The European Union (EU) has also increased its financial commitment to the CTR. But although the United States has implemented destruction-assistance programmes with respect to conventional weapons, these do not appear comparable in scope to the CTR effort. Before 11 September 2001, certain European governments were viewed as notoriously lax on export controls (for example, in the context of the Missile Technology Control Regime) in both conventional and unconventional areas. The evident interest of Islamist terrorists in WMD, the ongoing or accelerating nature of nuclear weapons programmes in North Korea and Iran, and the

extent of the illicit AQ Khan supply network for nuclear technology have focused minds on the unconventional side. At the same time, it may have reduced attention to conventional SALW.

While the UN Programme of Action on SALW has mobilized European nations to better regulate small arms dealers, national response levels have been variable. In 2003, the Council adopted a common position mandating that member states introduce national legislation regulating arms brokering. The EU has also formally recognized the global nature of the counter-terrorism challenge presented by the supply of SALW to terrorist groups via illegal arms networks. Brussels' emphasis, however, has not been specifically on terrorism. Rather, it has focused on building on the national transparency standards imposed by the UN Register of Conventional Arms by establishing a legally binding common instrument that requires marking and tracing of weapons to facilitate the identification of manufacturers and serial numbers worldwide and effectuates the enforcement of these requirements by national governments.⁵ Likewise, the EU has prided itself in contributing some €52 million to disarmament programmes in Cambodia, Southeastern Europe and Latin America and disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) schemes in East and West Africa, and in encouraging member states to institute end-user certification and verification procedures at the regional and subregional levels.⁶ The EU has acknowledged that the estimated 100,000 MANPADS in global circulation "are extremely lethal, easily concealable and inexpensive" that "have increasingly become a terrorist tool for threatening civil aviation."⁷ But Brussels has taken no specific operational measures with respect to MANPADS, merely supporting the expansion of the UN Register to include them and the regionalization of export controls through the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and their internationalization through the Group of Eight.⁸

There is, to be sure, a culture of ground-level cooperation among national law enforcement agencies founded on the TREVI counter-terrorism arrangement prompted by the heavy terrorist activity (domestic and international) in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. But this *de facto* infrastructure is essentially an array of bilateral relationships and practices—not a multilateral network. EU counter-terrorism on an institutional basis has tended to be big on rhetoric and short on implementation. Since 11 September 2001, the EU has defined terrorist offences, expanded its official list of proscribed terrorist groups, prohibited the supply of weapons to such groups (including al-Qaeda) and instituted a Europe-wide arrest warrant. But the porous nature of intra-EU (that is, non-Schengen) borders makes enforcement and intelligence cooperation and the imposition of border security politically and operationally more difficult. Thus, enforcement has redounded mainly to national authorities. While Europol, the EU's police organization, does function as a clearinghouse for general threat information—including that relating to SALW and explosives and to terrorism—it nets in only law enforcement agencies and not intelligence services and has not yet developed into a mechanism for sharing highly sensitive classified current intelligence. Furthermore, its dedicated counter-terrorism resources remain relatively sparse and lightly funded.

Even since 11 September 2001, most European governments have continued to approach terrorism as predominantly a risk-management problem to be handled with a threat-based security system, whereby specific emergent risks are assessed and minimized. European governments tend to be sceptical about both the social and economic cost of vulnerability- or capabilities-based measures and their inherent feasibility.⁹ Accordingly, for the three years following 11 September 2001, Europe's territorial security efforts were largely aspirational, and substantive changes marginal. For any link between counter-terrorism and the control of SALW and explosives to be established, such control would have to be seen as integral to "homeland" or "territorial" security. Yet this was not among the seven areas included in the EU's post-11

September 2001 counter-terrorism programme. Only heightened air transport security—in which Europe was already superior to the United States—was a direct response to the attacks in New York and Washington. In a June 2002 EU report on its response to 11 September 2001, territorial security was broached only in the context of emergency preparedness for terrorist attacks with WMD, particularly those involving biological weapons.

After the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, a more robust approach to EU territorial security appeared to take root. During the European Council summit held on 25–26 March 2004, the heads of government agreed to intensify efforts to share information bilaterally and through Europol, to tighten border controls, and to strengthen cooperation with non-EU countries. Javier Solana, the Secretary General of the Council, appointed former Dutch Deputy Interior Minister Gijs de Vries to fill the new post of Counter-terrorism Coordinator to operate within the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. Subsequently, the development of EU counter-terrorism policy became a predominant theme in Council deliberations. At the June 2004 summit, the Council enumerated the achievements made in the previous three months—particularly with respect to information flow and border controls. It called for more active work to combat terrorist financing, to facilitate information exchange between intelligence agencies, and to enhance civil protection. And it underlined “the importance of making use of the wide-ranging instruments of the European Union in the context of all factors which contribute to terrorism.” Finally, the Council announced its intention to review progress twice a year beginning in December 2004.

Over time, however, despite widespread outrage about the bombings, they failed to drive security issues—including terrorism—to the top of the popular European political agenda. In April 2004, de Vries himself also noted that for both political and operational reasons, the EU had only a limited capacity to significantly improve European security against terrorism, and that the larger share of the burden of doing so remained on national governments. Indeed, de Vries is answerable to those national governments by way of the European Council rather than to the European Commission. At the OSCE’s Annual Security Review Conference in Vienna on 23–24 June 2004, de Vries spoke at the session on preventing and combating terrorism. He emphasized EU cooperation with the OSCE and other countries and its assistance to third countries in raising their counter-terrorism capabilities. Among advances in the EU’s intrinsic capabilities, he stressed only progress on border security in terms of heightened use of biometric and air passenger data and information sharing on lost and stolen passports. Border security was perhaps the most conspicuous problem illuminated by the Madrid attacks, which were undoubtedly rendered easier by Spain’s exposure to North Africa and the difficulty of monitoring legal and especially illegal immigrants.¹⁰

While better border security will perforce discourage the smuggling of SALW and explosives, it is not specifically focused on those threats. If one clear substantive effect of the Madrid attacks has been increased momentum within the EU to render the European Border Police Agency more capable through integrated border management, it is equally clear that the Madrid attacks did not prompt a significant intensification of EU-level efforts to curtail the flow of SALW and explosives. More direct and substantial multilateral measures implicating SALW have originated with the United States—mainly in the form of the Container Security Initiative (CSI), under which US Customs officials are stationed in European ports pursuant to bilateral agreements to pre-screen US-bound cargo. Broad European participation, of course, does reflect European recognition of transatlantic security interdependency: the enlisted ports account for over 90% of all maritime container traffic from the EU to the United States. Furthermore, containers would be a likely mode of transport for illicit arms and munitions, including MANPADS, which are only about six feet long and weigh roughly 50 pounds.

On balance, the most muscular EU initiative on SALW remains essentially political rather than operational, namely, the adoption and implementation of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The EU Code reinforces the strictures for avoiding destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons imposed by both the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the 1996 Wassenaar Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, under which 33 countries (including most EU members) are required to exchange confidentially information on their sales of nine categories of conventional weapons, including SALW and MANPADS, to non-participating countries. The EU Code establishes a set of criteria for granting export licenses for military equipment, a regime for sharing information on licensing decisions and data collection and annual reporting requirements applicable to the 25 members of the EU. While the Code thus far is not legally binding, compliance by EU member states is relatively high. Impetus for instituting the Code came primarily from the potential for rash arms exports to fuel state-based insecurity and stability in the Middle East, southeastern Europe and Africa rather than terrorism by non-state actors. The eight export guideline criteria set forth in the Code as risks to be avoided or minimized accordingly contemplate primarily state misuse of imported weapons. The seventh, however, does confront “the risk that the equipment [will] be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions,” which in turn includes “the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist organizations.”¹¹

WAYS FORWARD

TIGHTENING THE EU CODE OF CONDUCT ON ARMS EXPORTS

There is no doubt that the transparency and accountability for exporting arms, including SALW and military-grade explosives, have increased on account of the EU Code through the public reporting system. But there is a considerable discrepancy between the expansive information that countries *could* be urged to report and the relatively limited information that they actually *do* report. Narrowing this discrepancy could have substantial positive impacts on European counter-terrorism capabilities. Under the EU Code, EU member states are presently asked to specify mainly financial details such as the value of export licenses and actual arms exports, which offer scarcely a clue about the specific types of weapons involved or the nature of potential ultimate consumers. As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has noted, this limitation “illustrates a paradox of EU reporting: the type of information most commonly reported is the least relevant for an evaluation of the implementation of the EU Code of Conduct.”¹²

Additional data not now required for collection and exchange by participating states would be highly probative in identifying, for counter-terrorist prevention purposes, weapons that would be vulnerable to falling into the hands of terrorists or suppliers of terrorists. Such data might include descriptions of the weapons and their quantity, the type of end-user, and the final destination of any weapons that are to be re-exported, as well as any restrictive contractual conditions and the names of producing and supplying companies. Requiring this kind of information would limit any inclination on the part of exporting countries to limit their scrutiny to the immediate purchaser and look the other way with respect to other users.¹³

SIPRI notes, perceptively, that while such information, in conjunction with financial terms, would be commercially sensitive in revealing unit prices to potential competitors, from a security point of view it would be preferable to require equipment details and dispense with financial ones

rather than vice versa. Shared information on denials of export licenses and the outcome of intergovernmental consultations on undercuts has also provided insufficient detail about the specific countries involved.¹⁴ Remedying these shortfalls could effectively red flag possible customers for illicit arms and perpetrators or sponsors of terrorist activity. Furthermore, making compliance with the EU Code a binding legal obligation rather than just an implied political one would render strengthened information requirements much easier to enforce. Detailed information on arms transfers should also be made available as quickly as possible (the present two-year lag limits the information's operational utility) and in a mode (for example, via the Internet) that is as easy to access as practicable.

DEMAND-SIDE SOLUTIONS

The EU is and has been engaged in a number of conflict resolution efforts that could both improve and detract from the control of conventional arms. Winding down conflict diminishes the number of active combatants in a given locale, but incomplete or unsatisfactory redress of grievances leaves open the possibility that they may regress into violence. Demand side measures like DDR plans for re-employing former combatants—to which the EU and many of its member states have made substantial contributions—as well as development programs and security sector reform address this problem by helping to ensure that erstwhile fighters, terrorists and criminals do not take up arms again.

The proximity of Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Maghreb to Central and Western Europe and the former regions' socio-religious provenance potentially makes them logistically and ideologically expeditious sources of inspiration to terrorists. The EU would therefore do well to continue to support DDR in these regions, and, beyond that, to enhance and expand such support. In particular, the EU could use its considerable economic influence to urge those agencies primarily responsible for administering DDR programmes to incorporate aggressive arms destruction programmes.

SUPPLY-SIDE SOLUTIONS

The weapons used by Palestinian and Chechen militants in currently active conflicts, as well as those used in Eurasian "frozen conflicts," in Europe's "near abroad" tend to come from non-European sources. But the infiltration of illicit weapons into the Balkans after the Cold War did contribute to conflict there, and they were regarded as a potential "field of jihad" by al-Qaeda even if Islamism failed to take firm hold. More broadly, weapons used in conflicts that are winding down in Africa—for instance, Sierra Leone and Liberia—could find a ready market among radical Muslims in regional locales such as Nigeria or, farther north, in the Maghreb, where they could pose a direct threat to Europe. Accordingly, there is consensus among EU member states that weapons that are in excess of the current requirements of national armies should be destroyed or otherwise decommissioned.

Demand-side programs already mentioned may help, but such programmes do not always include weapons collection, management and destruction components that keep the weapons themselves out of illicit circulation. Nevertheless, some EU member states have also focused on that kind of scheme as well. The United Kingdom, for instance, provided £7.5 million from programmes managed by the UN Development Programme to collect and destroy weapons in over 25 countries.¹⁵ As noted, Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Maghreb are potentially abundant and sympathetic suppliers to terrorists. The EU should continue to support weapons destruction programmes in Southeastern Europe and the Maghreb, and to enhance such

support. In addition, it would make sense for both Europol and the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator to establish formal mechanisms for monitoring the progress any out-of-area programmes involving weapons (including those the EU and members states might not support) that could find their way into terrorist hands so as to flag potential sources of illicit supply.

PROACTIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM

Any new EU policy initiative should take on board the fact that bilateral links are the thickest in the law enforcement and intelligence arenas. This reality suggests that wholesale EU-wide solutions, at least in the first instance, may be too ambitious. One approach might be to concentrate first on the geographical areas in which small arms traffic and terrorism coalesce to the greatest extent. Eastern and Southeastern Europe are certainly two such areas.

In this vein, the Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center for Combating Transborder Crime, based in Bucharest, in which 11 countries participate, has paid some attention to the problem and made marginal progress. In particular, the SECI Center established in early 2003 the Anti-terrorism Task Force (ATTF), which includes three highly relevant projects: the Task Force on Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons; the Task Force on Trafficking in Weapons of Mass Destruction; and the Task Force on Terrorist Groups. The Islamist terrorist attack in Istanbul in November 2003 gave new impetus to the ATTF's efforts coordinate regional counter-terrorism efforts, prompting the ATTF (under Turkish leadership) to compose an investigative report on the attack to inform preventive measures at the national and regional levels. Further institutionalization of such practices would make sense, as would extending them to other areas on Europe's periphery such as the Middle East and North Africa. Longer term, prescribed objectives could include strengthening the capacities of national law enforcement and intelligence agencies and that of Europol to identify links between SALW and terrorism. For instance, the collection and reporting of data on arms transfers under the EU Code of Conduct, intelligence on the interdiction of WMD and related technologies or materials and, for example, information on weapons missing from DDR inventories could be more thoroughly integrated with routine multilateral and national law enforcement and intelligence activities.

TERRITORIAL SECURITY

Given the political constraints on building supranational power in the EU, Europe may not collectively develop the community competence required to impose territorial security.¹⁶ Thus, say, an emergent MANPADS threat to commercial aviation from terrorists operating within a European country will have to be handled primarily by that country's national civilian security authorities and military forces. Indeed, this occurred in February 2003, when over 1,000 soldiers were deployed for over a week in west London to help police protect Heathrow International Airport on the strength of a civilian intelligence assessment that commercial passenger airliners could be the targets of terrorist surface-to-air missile attacks.

The EU is not a United States of Europe, and lacks the supranational power to effect and harmonize simultaneous changes in the policies of its constituent national governments. This deficit has a greater impact on territorial security than on proactive law enforcement narrowly construed. For example, it would be politically difficult for the EU to enact comprehensive regulations on port security, terrorism insurance or first-response capacities, as the United States is doing, and European governments could not be expected to harmonize multiple laws in these areas. In May 2002, the European Commission announced the possibility of a multinational EU border patrol that would work with Europol. A promising 15-day trial had been held in which

guards from EU member states had patrolled the borders of France, Italy and Spain, stopping 4,500 illegal immigrants and arresting 34 alleged drug traffickers. Despite this success, the EU interior ministers' meeting in Luxembourg in the subsequent month resulted in near-paralysis on border security and immigration issues.

If 11 September 2001 did not immediately weakened the "political correctness" barriers in Europe to the political mainstream's confronting the need for tighter immigration laws and border security as it did in the United States, however, 11 March 2004 may have done so. Before the Madrid bombings, a EU wide border patrol, approved in principle at the EU summit in Seville in June 2002, was not contemplated as being operational until 2007. In October 2003, however, ministers from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain met in the French town of La Baule to discuss expediting more effective means of addressing immigration and terrorism challenges. French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy proposed the creation of a "European security zone" to insulate Europe against illegal immigration via the Mediterranean Sea, to be patrolled by North African as well as EU states bordering the sea. The ministers agreed that all common carriers should be required to release passenger data, and mooted the possibility of requiring biometric data in Schengen visas. Thus, there are some areas in which room for a substantial EU contribution has probably expanded on account of Madrid. These include visa monitoring, passenger information and container security.¹⁷

For EU action on SALW and explosives to become operationally more effective, though, border security and proactive counter-terrorism operations—namely, intelligence collection and law enforcement—need to be further integrated. Ideally, relevant information routinely gleaned by external border guards under the Schengen system should be systematically integrated into a EU-wide database accessible to EU and other intergovernmental agencies, intelligence and law enforcement authorities of member states, and those of EU partners (for example the United States).¹⁸ Border-agency identifications of known or suspected arms traffickers or members of armed insurgencies, for instance, would be especially useful to intelligence and law enforcement agencies in their efforts to stanch the flow of SALW.

The Schengen Information System (SIS), in which most EU members plus Norway and Iceland participate, is potentially a useful tool. Each participant is required to issue alerts on illegal aliens from outside the EU seeking visas, including authorized documentary, photographic and biometric means of identification. The European Automated Fingerprints Identification System, known as "Eurodac", is an element of the system. Designed to monitor and curtail "asylum shopping," the system registers in a central and commonly accessible database in Brussels the fingerprints of asylum applicants over the age of 14 and certain other illegal immigrants. The system, based on American technology, has impressive technical capabilities: it can run up to 500,000 fingerprint comparisons per second, with better than 99.9% precision.¹⁹ But the European Commission required that no information acquired or developed by Eurodac under the supervision of immigration authorities be provided to police or intelligence services.²⁰

While the EU has allocated funding for extending the SIS to new members, who are required to apply the system, the existing restrictions on access to Eurodac and a general reluctance to impose additional biometric requirements circumscribe the security utility of the SIS. In early 2005, the European Commission began to consider seriously how Eurodac could be responsibly used for counter-terrorism purposes.²¹

Notes

- ¹ Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk*, 2004.
- ² Noted experts, however, caution that the terrorist threat from MANPADS may have been overstated. A recent RAND Corporation study pegged that threat at 13 on a scale of 100. Eric Lipton, "U.S. Is Set to Test Missile Defenses Aboard Airlines", *New York Times*, 29 May 2005, p. A1.
- ³ Notably, in May 2005 a plot emerged by an Islamist group called Brigade Istimata International to attack the US embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia with an RPG packed with 300 pounds of explosives and rat poison.
- ⁴ See, for example, John Parachini, "Putting WMD Terrorism Into Perspective", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 4, 2003, pp. 37–50. See also Harald Müller, "Terrorism, Proliferation: A European Threat Assessment", Institute for Security Studies, *Chaillot Paper no. 56*, 2003, pp. 70–72.
- ⁵ EU Presidency Statement, "Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons", 14 June 2004.
- ⁶ EU Presidency Statement, "Cluster: Conventional Weapons", 10 October 2004.
- ⁷ Ibid. The total number of MANPADS in government arsenals worldwide is estimated to exceed 350,000. See, for example, Eric Lipton, "U.S. Is Set to Test Missile Defenses Aboard Airlines", *New York Times*, 29 May 2005, p. A1.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ See generally Jonathan Stevenson, "How Europe and America Defend Themselves", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 2, 2003, pp. 75–90.
- ¹⁰ *Chair's Report*, OSCE 2004 Annual Security Review Conference, 29 July 2004, p. 11. While about 300,000 Moroccans reside legally in Spain, tens of thousands are there illegally.
- ¹¹ See generally Sibylle Bauer and Mark Bromley, "The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports: Improving the Annual Report", Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 8, 2004.
- ¹² Ibid., p. 13.
- ¹³ Ibid., pp. 10, 13–14.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 15–16.
- ¹⁵ See UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2004–06, p. 3.
- ¹⁶ See Kristin Archick, "Europe and Counterterrorism: Strengthening Police and Judicial Cooperation", *Report for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, 23 July 2002, pp. 13–14; Raf Casert, "Ashcroft, EU Counterparts Seek Closer Cooperation in Battle Against Terrorism", *Associated Press*, 11 September 2002.
- ¹⁷ See generally Jonathan Stevenson, *Counter-terrorism: Containment and Beyond*, International Institute for Security Studies, Adelphi Paper 367, 2004, pp. 28–32.
- ¹⁸ For a useful blueprint, see Andrus Öövel, "The Contribution of Border Security Agencies in the War on Terror", Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Conference Paper, 2004, pp. 5–8.
- ¹⁹ Karl Cushing, "Security Concerns at Immigration Database Launch", *Computer Weekly*, 23 January 2003, p. 14; Rachel Fielding, "System Will Simplify Asylum Process", *Computing*, 30 January 2003, p. 20.
- ²⁰ Some European civil-liberties activists found even this safeguard unsatisfactory. See, for example, "Asylum-seekers Set to Face Fingerprint Rule Across EU", *EIU ViewsWire*, 17 January 2003.
- ²¹ Considerable resistance to such integration—notably from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees—remains. See David Cronin, "Don't Blur Lines Between Asylum and Fight Against Terrorism", *European Voice*, 7 October 2004.

ACRONYMS

ATTF	Anti-terrorism Task Force
CSI	Container Security Initiative
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation
ETA	<i>Euskadi ta Askatasuna</i>
EU	European Union
Eurodac	European Automated Fingerprints Identification System
IRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
MANPADS	man portable air defence missiles
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RPG	rocket-propelled grenade
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SECI	Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SIS	Schengen Information System
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
WMDs	weapons of mass destruction

