Saferworld.org.uk Light weapons controls and security assistance: A review of current practice Executive Summary Introduction For a long time, the concerns of the international community have centred on restricting the spread of so-called weapons of mass destruction and of major conventional weaponry, as these types of weapons were thought to pose the greatest threat to international peace and security. This meant that supplier states have not, until recently, dedicated appropriate means and resources to tackling the widespread availability and use of light weapons in regions of conflict. However, as the true consequences of light weapons proliferation are now becoming apparent, there is a growing understanding that something must be done. Stemming the supply of light weapons National Measures There are considerable differences in the export policies of states with regard to light weapons. While a limited number of states, including Argentina and Romania, are reported to have no restrictions on the export of ‘long guns’ or handguns, most states will in practice regulate their import and export. However, national procedures governing the export of light weapons vary widely. The report has found a number of areas where such policies differ: Licensing: Differences exist both in the types of licences required, and in the licensing authority responsible for issuing or denying a licence. Categorisation: Most countries will apply different controls to different types of weapons (for example, controls over automatic weapons will often be more rigorous than those applied to single-shot hunting rifles); items which are controlled for export also vary from country to country. Export criteria: Although most exporting states have similar criteria governing the export of arms, in practice, the implementation of such criteria will often vary widely. Parliamentary scrutiny: Systems of parliamentary review of arms exports vary widely; details are provided on either a statutory or customary basis, or are supplied on an ad hoc basis (e.g. in response to parliamentary questions). The level of detail also varies from: detailed descriptions of all sales with procedures for prior notification of sales above a certain value to parliamentary committees (as in the US), to low levels of detail as a result of stringent commercial confidentiality provisions, (as is the case in Austria). End-use: Differences exist both in the types of certification required, and in the degree to which exporting countries verify end-use. This can vary from: a reliance on written end-use assurances; to verification through embassies or diplomatic services. Brokering: Most governments have been reluctant to address the issue of brokering and trafficking because of the extra-territorial implications involved. However, some governments have begun to intervene by requiring those engaged in brokering to be licensed, and by making individual brokering transactions subject to export legislation. Regional measures Export controls are most effective when applied consistently and on a multilateral basis. While national policies are important, there is always a danger of unilateral action being undermined by other suppliers with less stringent export control policies. Over the past few years, a number of efforts have been made to co-ordinate restraint. For example: EU co-ordination: The report details a number of ways in which the EU (and EU Member States) have begun to address both the licit trade (through the adoption of a Code of Conduct governing arms exports). The Wassenaar Arrangement: The report also details how small arms are now increasingly part of the agenda of the Wassenaar Arrangement - for example, through its involvement in the West African Moratorium initiative. Tackling the illicit trade in light weapons In addition to legitimate (registered, government approved) sales of light weapons, there are also the substantially larger illicit and 'grey' markets.These categoreis cover a wide range of transactions both within and between states, including: Legitimate transfers that are diverted, or re-exported; Brokering of transfers by third parties; Smuggling of arms from one region, where a conflict has ended, to other regions of tension; Transfers in exchange for other black market or ‘illicit’ commodities, such as drugs, ivory, diamonds etc. The circulation and trafficking of weapons, especially light weapons, is increasingly becoming a problem of international dimensions. Many of the estimated 200,000 light weapons circulating amongst the civilian population in Albania, for example, are now finding their way into neighbouring countries, such as Greece, Italy and beyond. Similarly, arms originating from the Former Soviet Union are beginning to find their way into the European Union through, for example, the Baltic states. The role of regional and international organisations is therefore of increasing importance in tackling the illicit trade in light weapons. A number of regional and international organisations are beginning to address the issue. This report gives an overview of such initiatives, including: EU Member States adopting a Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms in 1997. The Programme contains three main elements. Firstly, Member States have agreed to strengthen their collective efforts to prevent and combat the illicit trafficking of arms from their territories. Secondly, the Programme provides for assisting affected countries through capacity building measures. And finally, the Programme sets out measures to reduce the numbers of arms in circulation through weapons collection, buy-back, and destruction programmes. OAS states agreeing an Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials in 1997. The Convention provides for exchange of information on producers, dealers, and exporters of light weapons, as well as information relating to the routes and methods of concealment that they have used. Interpol establishing an International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System (IWETS) which seeks to track and recover stolen weapons. Whilst the system is currently at an early stage of development, and many developing countries lack the resources to use the system, it does represent a valuable tool in tracking lost or stolen weapons from country to country. OAU Member States agreeing a statement on light weapons at the 34th summit in Burkino Faso in 1998. West African States seeking agreement on a regional moratorium on light weapons. This idea was proposed by Mali in November 1996. The idea has since been encouraged by the UNDP and Wassenaar Member States, and is currently being implemented. Increased involvement of the South African Development Community in issues relating to the illegal trafficking of light weapons. A sub-Committee has identified trafficking in firearms as being a serious threat to the region, and has recommended a number of measures to tackle the problem. Further measures were discussed in a meeting between EU and SADC Member States in May 1998. The UN increasingly focusing on light weapons issues: in addition to UN General Assembly Resolutions, and reports of the Secretary General, the UN established a Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in 1995, and a follow-on group in 1998, to evaluate steps taken to implement the recommendations of the initial panel. Elsewhere, the UN’s Economic and Social Council’s Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has undertaken a survey of firearms regulations and, in April 1998, passed a resolution calling for a legally binding convention to combat firearms trafficking. Reducing demand There is growing recognition that supply-side restrictions are not, in themselves, sufficient to tackle the widespread use and circulation of light weapons, since they can do little to remove arms and ammunition already stockpiled within regions of tension. It has been estimated that there are eight times as many arms awaiting disposal as have been transferred in the entire post cold-war period. Many countries have inadequate resources to destroy or safely store surplus weapons, and, rather than spending scarce resources on collecting and destroying weapons in circulation, have a financial incentive to sell them. Thus, weapons are continually circulating, either from state to state, or across borders through ‘leakage’ from sub-state groups and individuals. To date, there have been numerous national and bilateral initiatives to reduce the demand for arms in conflict-prone regions, and to remove surplus arms from circulation. Broadly speaking, such initiatives can be divided into two categories: those programmes which directly remove arms from society, and those programmes which indirectly result in fewer arms circulating within regions of tension. Examples of the former would include demobilisation and reintegration programmes, buy-back schemes, and collection programmes. Examples of the latter would include: tackling the root causes of instability and conflict; reducing insecurity through building the capacity of the police, judiciary, and security forces; and reduction of cross-border arms flows through support for local customs and border controls. Demobilisation and reintegration programmes. The report details how, in post-conflict situations states, faced with huge budget deficits, compounded by an overdeveloped military capacity, will often seek to demobilise large numbers of former combatants. Such programmes have now been implemented in over 20 countries, involving some 1.25 million combatants, and are increasingly being supported by international donors, in particular the World Bank and UNDP. The report details examples of such programmes, including problems encountered, and possible 'pointers' for future policy application. Buy-back or exchange schemes. The report sets out how a number of countries have sought to implement gun ‘buy-back’ or exchange schemes, whereby cash sums, or commodities such as food or agricultural inputs, are offered in return for weapons. Such programmes are often developed in response to horrific massacres or high murder levels, and have been implemented (with varying degrees of success) in countries including Australia, Colombia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Somalia and the UK. The report details notable successes and failures, and offers examples of 'best practice'. The ‘Security First’ approach. Countries with high levels of insecurity or violence typically cannot make effective use of economic or social development assistance. Yet, development aid is rarely co-ordinated with security assistance. The government of Mali, together with the UNDP, sought to address this problem by using a proportion of development aid to tackle underlying security problems, such as the widespread proliferation and use of light weapons. However, as the report shows, international programmes to help conflict-prone countries to maintain internal security or control arms flows remain poorly developed. Capacity building. Light weapons flows from old conflicts in one country can serve to destabilise neighbouring countries. Many states in regions of tension lack the basic institutional capability to inhibit or prevent arms flows across their borders. Some donors have sought to assist in building local capacity in order to reduce the potential for intra-regional arms flows through the provision of technical expertise, equipment and infrastructure, and training. At a regional level, the recently agreed EU Programme and OAS Convention both provide for co-operation with, and provision of, technical assistance for the training of, customs and border officials on the ground in affected regions.