



United Nations Institute for  
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## European Union SALW and ERW Programmes in the Western Balkans

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## NOTE

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## SUMMARY

This paper was written as part of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research's (UNIDIR's) project on the European Union's activities concerning small arms and light weapons (SALW) and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) was asked to provide information on the European Union's engagement in the Western Balkans—Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia and Montenegro, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania.

Specifically, BICC was requested to provide input on the following issues:

- a survey of SALW and ERW control activities funded by the European Union (EU) between 2001 and 2005;
- planning and decision-making processes of the projects;
- evaluation mechanisms and impact assessments;
- the effects of evaluation and impact assessment results on future projects; and
- recommendations for future EU activities.



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## EUROPEAN UNION SALW AND ERW PROGRAMMES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

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### PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

This paper was written as part of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research's (UNIDIR's) project on the European Union's activities concerning small arms and light weapons (SALW) and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) was asked to provide information on the European Union's engagement in the Western Balkans—Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia and Montenegro, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania.

Specifically, BICC was requested to provide input on the following issues:

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- evaluation mechanisms and impact assessments;
- the effects of evaluation and impact assessment results on future projects; and
- recommendations for future EU activities.

### METHOD

BICC's research was based on three elements:

- *Field research* was carried out in Skopje, Macedonia and Belgrade, Serbia by BICC through interviews in the field, and through analysis of local documents provided by the various project managers. BICC personnel were language capable, though most interviews were conducted in English and many documents were in that language.
- *Interviews* were carried out over a number of days with officials in Brussels. Supplementary and follow-up interviews were carried out by telephone from Bonn. The data was also amended based on e-mail correspondence.
- *Desk research* was carried out by a team of three researchers, supplemented by other BICC personnel. This included literature and internet searches, as well as analysis of documents received during the interviews and field work.

### DETERMINING FACTORS FOR EU SALW POLICY

The EU has recognized the dangers resulting from the uncontrolled proliferation and spread of SALW, and has decided to take action to counter the problem. As a consequence, the EU has developed one of the most advanced weapons transfer control systems, and SALW control is firmly set in the EU political agenda, including in the negotiations with new members.

EU decisions on SALW are mainly based on three elements: the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, the EU Joint Action, and international agreements and regulations. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998 with the goal of harmonizing the EU member states' policies and regulations concerning arms exports, and to achieve uniform minimum standards within the EU. The EU Joint Action aims at developing and implementing measures to fight the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW, and to reduce the number of SALW available, and to find solutions for the problems resulting from their availability.

In addition, the EU supports international efforts to improve SALW control. Among other things, its member states contributed considerably to the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects, and the European Community has signed the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.

### ACCESSION PROCESS/ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE AS SALW ACTION

Probably the most important, albeit unintentional, tool for SALW action in the Western Balkans is the accession process to the enlarged EU. The process requires stricter SALW and ERW control regulations than had been in place in any of the countries concerned. In order to be considered for future membership in the EU, candidate states must coordinate their policies with existing EU policies, including those on SALW and ERW. They are required to adapt their legislation concerning SALW to European regulations, and they have to take measures to implement these laws appropriately. As a consequence, countries in the Balkan region, for example Macedonia and Croatia, appear to be attempting to conform to the EU Code of Conduct and Joint Action on SALW.<sup>1</sup> We discuss these activities in detail below.

### OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/EU ACTION IN THE BALKANS

Due to its geographical proximity to the EU, the Balkans have been one of the main areas for EU activities on SALW control. Currently, there are three major SALW control projects on the Balkans supported by the EU: SEESAC (the South East Europe Regional Clearinghouse for Small Arms Reduction) working on a regional level; a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP) ammunition destruction project in Albania, managed by NAMSA (NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency); and SALW control activities carried out by EUFOR (European Force in the Balkans) in BiH. There are also SALW control elements in a number of other projects that are not targeted at SALW, but which nonetheless have explicit or inherent SALW effects.

#### SEESAC

The South East Europe Regional Clearinghouse for Small Arms Reduction, located in Belgrade, is a joint initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SP). It had originally been initiated as a three-year technical programme, operating at both regional and national levels, sponsored by UNDP and the Stability Pact, with political support from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Szeged Small Arms Process, and NATO. Its overall objectives include to support the Stability Pact Implementation Plan that aims to stem the flow and availability of small arms and light weapons in the region, to consolidate the gains associated with the implementation plan at the national and local levels, and to support the socio-economic conditions for peace and development.<sup>2</sup>

SEESAC offers technical support and services to individual UNDP programmes in the region as well as directly to the local governments and international and local agencies working in the region. UNDP is the agency predominantly occupied with SALW control activities in the region, and plays a major role in implementation. UNDP has full political support from the EU. The EU also contributes financially to the SALW and ERW control activities implemented by UNDP. The financial support for SEESAC had been given to UNDP in form of a grant.

The European Commission has actively supported SEESAC with funding totalling €830,000 (2002–2004).<sup>3</sup> In 2002, an initial amount of €200,000 had been foreseen as financial contribution to SEESAC. In 2003, €300,000 were contributed and an additional €330,000 in 2004. Funds are allocated for SEESAC personnel costs. In 2003, the salary costs of the team leader and the NGO/SALW awareness facilitator were covered. In 2004, this was expanded to also cover costs for the other operational members of the team.<sup>4</sup> The continuation of SEESAC's work for 2005 and 2006 has been recommended by UNDP and the Stability Pact.<sup>5</sup>

#### ALBANIA: NATO PfP TRUST FUND<sup>6</sup>

The EU through the Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex) has, in the main, actively supported and funded ammunition destruction projects in Albania.<sup>7</sup> In December 2002, an EU-supported ammunition destruction project started, involving the consolidation and demilitarization of surplus ammunition over a four-year period. It is managed under the terms of the NATO PfP Trust Fund by Luxembourg-based NAMSA. The decision to support the project was based on a EU Council Decision.<sup>8</sup>

The overall objective of the action is to contribute to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in Albania, and in particular to the environment-friendly destruction of ammunition there.

The EU has contributed €820,000 to the project in the form of a grant that has mainly been used, during a period of 12 months, towards the costs of the acquisition of an Explosive Waste Incinerator and an associated Pollution Control System, to contribute to the salary of an expatriate Technical Advisor, to the purchase of three vehicles, 10 radios and two computers, and to the costs of SALW Ammunition processing and demilitarization at the Mjekes factory.<sup>9</sup> In 2004, the amount was extended to an additional €500,000.<sup>10</sup> Estimated overall costs of the project over the four-year period amount to €6,400,000.<sup>11</sup>

The primary role of the EU in this project is financial support, and it has no role in actual project implementation, which is managed by NAMSA.<sup>12</sup>

#### BiH: EUFOR-ALTHEA

On 2 December 2004, the authority of NATO's Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR)<sup>13</sup> was transferred to the European military force, known as EUFOR<sup>14</sup>. EUFOR is a manifestation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EUFOR's mission, also known as ALTHEA, is the EU's military contribution to the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is the third and largest military operation that the EU has embarked upon to date. It followed NATO's decision to conclude its SFOR mission.

Since the handover from SFOR, the EUFOR has been directly involved in SALW/ERW control through the limited continuation of Operation Harvest.<sup>15</sup> Between 16 November and 20

December 2004, EUFOR conducted a door-to-door “Harvest Operation” in Mostar and suburbs, called “Operation Free Entrance 11”. It was conducted by the Multinational Task Force (South-East), in close cooperation with the local authorities and local police.

The operation began under the SFOR mandate and ended under the EUFOR mandate. Two-hundred and eight small arms, 1,055 hand grenades, 193 rifle grenades, 8 anti-personnel mines, 76,502 rounds of ammunition, 79 anti-tank rockets and 119kg of TNT were collected.<sup>16</sup> Operation Free Entrance 11 was followed by “Operation Free Entrance 12”, a major door-to-door operation in Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, taking place from 21 February to 2 March 2005. It was a joint operation, undertaken by EUFOR troops from Multi-National Task Force (South East) in close partnership with BiH and Republika Srpska interior authorities and police forces. Operation Free Entrance 12 is seen as a success by the military and civilian authorities. It collected more than 243,000 rounds of ammunition, about 3,900 hand grenades, 658 small arms, 167 rifle grenades, 17 rockets and 40kg of bulk explosive. The operation was preceded by a “Run for Peace” and a concert on 20 February 2005 to raise public awareness.<sup>17</sup> “Harvest Operations” are ongoing SALW-collection operations within EUFOR areas. There is an ongoing Harvest Operation, but the latest results have not yet been made available.

There are three different types of Harvest Operations. In the first type, EUFOR forces make public that they will be around on a certain day in a town or neighbourhood, and that people can drop off weapons at a collection point on that day. In the second, EUFOR forces will go directly to people’s houses and ask if they have anything to turn in. Anyone turning in weapons under these types of operations faces no punishment, as the amnesty remains in effect. The third type of operation is intelligence led. EUFOR forces will react upon information they have received on illegal weapons holdings or hideouts. This information usually comes from reports people make to one of the force’s 45 Liaison and Observation Team (LOT) houses based around the country. The LOT house teams also help and advise local police on conducting their own Harvest operations.<sup>18</sup> Weapons and ammunition collected in EUFOR Harvest operations are destroyed with the involvement of local police and military. In one of these operations in May 2005, EUFOR monitored the destruction of about ten tons of various munitions of the Bosnian Serb Army at a destruction site near Kalinovik in the Republika Srpska. EUFOR estimated that there are 30,000 tons of surplus munitions remaining in storage in both parts of BiH, which continue to pose a serious threat.

In January 2005 Operation Spring Clean began. Spring Clean is not a Harvest Operation, but supports local authorities and the local police in their fight against organized crime and corruption.<sup>19</sup> It aims to limit the activities of organized crime in BiH, including the illegal trafficking of weapons. EUFOR conducts vehicle checkpoints to disrupt the organizations involved. The full operational details of Spring Clean are classified.<sup>20</sup>

While EUFOR is not deployed in BiH as a police force, it possesses a number of valuable military capabilities that can be used in support of wider operations by law enforcement authorities. Thus, there is close cooperation with the police forces in BiH.

The Integrated Police Unit (IPU) is an integral part of EUFOR.<sup>21</sup> Its authorized troop strength is currently 534. They support the local police and border services in fighting crime and preventing illegal cross-border activities. While IPU-conducted operations usually do not have a special SALW/ERW focus but rather a more general one, they often are directly related to SALW and ERW. Worth mentioning are Operation TARCIN and Operation STRIKE: Operation TARCIN took place in December 2004. In cooperation with the local police crime squad, a search

operation in the neighbourhoods of Sarajevo was conducted, based on an IPU intelligence activity. During the operation, a weapons cache was discovered in an abandoned building.

Operation STRIKE was targeting at disrupting illegal trafficking of weapons to other areas of the Balkans. As a result of the operation, which took place in Sarajevo in February 2005, 310 assault rifles, several magazines and some rounds were found in a house.<sup>22</sup>

EUFOR also actively engages in, and supports operations for the removal of ERW. According to the EUFOR Public Information Office, "EUFOR monitors the developments and works on the higher-level organizational part of de-mining. The Mine Action Centre (MAC) BiH coordinates the de-mining of BiH."<sup>23</sup>

## OTHER EU ACTIVITIES

In addition to the major, specific SALW-directed activities, other SALW-specific activities with EU involvement were identified in the region. It must be noted that the formal charter for many of these programs—for example the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme—do not make reference to SALW. Nonetheless, as our analysis indicates, these programs do have an effect on SALW issues.

Two regional CARDS-funded projects are relevant in this aspect. The Support and Coordination of Integrated Border Management Strategies and the Development of Reliable and Functioning Policing Systems programmes were funded under CARDS (about €3 million in 2003), which are likely to include SALW-related measures. Neither of these programmes have any explicit SALW component. Nonetheless, in our view, they are likely to have an impact on SALW in the region as well.

## Albania

In 2002–2003 the UNDP implemented a project called Small Arms and Light Weapons Control (SALWC) in Albania, under which the EU contributed to the purchase of 30 vehicles and 24 metal detectors for the weapons collection structure of the police.<sup>24</sup> SALWC was complemented by a follow-up project on SSSR (Support to Security Sector Reform).

According to the UNDP web site, the European Commission has contributed US\$ 476,992 to the project.<sup>25</sup> The European Commission Delegation in Tirana indicates that the EU supplies some limited funds for this project.<sup>26</sup> However, according to the SSSR Programme Manager, UNDP Albania, the EU provided financial support only for SALWC, but not for the SSSR Programme, though the UNDP is soliciting the EU for financial support.<sup>27</sup>

PAMECA (Police Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania) was set up on 21 December 2002. It is entirely funded by the EU through CARDS. The scope of the mission is to provide advice, training and expertise to the Ministries of Public Order and Justice. The long-term aim of the project is to help establish a more effective police service in Albania so that it can investigate and prevent criminal activities and ensure public order in the country, working in full cooperation with the judiciary.<sup>28</sup> PAMECA might have been marginally involved in SALW control issues through its Public Order element. However, according to the EU delegation in Albania, EU and PAMECA have no dedicated SALW control projects of their own.<sup>29</sup>

According to the UNDP web site, the Albanian Mine Action Program–Capacity-building Project has “secured principle approval from the EU for a \$9.9million multi-year integrated mine action programme”.<sup>30</sup>

### Bosnia and Herzegovina

In BiH, as in Albania, the EU is involved in SALW control activities both through direct SALW programmes, and, more extensively, through indirect programmes that may have an SALW control impact. An important, albeit “passive” element is the control of SALW flows created by the EU embargo on weapons to BiH. The EU Common Position on Arms to the BiH<sup>31</sup> helps in stemming supplies of SALW to BiH, albeit it does nothing to affect demand.

The EU, through SEESAC, is involved in UNDP’s Small Arms Project (SAP) in BiH, running from April 2003 to 30 September 2005. Within the framework of SAP, SEESAC financed an awareness-raising pilot project in BiH on SALW education in primary schools, implemented by the Red Cross BiH. SEESAC also financially contributed to the pilot weapons destruction project in BiH, which ran from July to October 2004 and resulted in the destruction of 20,000 surplus assault rifles, the development of a small arms survey, and a SALW Ammunition Demilitarization Feasibility Study. In June 2005, UNDP received a total of US\$ 1.5 million for 2005 from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for a new project called Small Arms Control in BiH (SACBIH). The total project budget is US\$ 11 million until 2009.<sup>32</sup> It should be noted that UNDP has its own evaluation practices, and these are fed into the UNDP’s planning and implementation of future projects.<sup>33</sup> However, this information is not fed back to the EU donor.

The European Commission also supports ERW projects in BiH. These projects are coordinated through the UN Mine Action office in Sarajevo and the BiH Mine Action Centre.<sup>34</sup> EU support in this area includes the creation of self-sustainable civil protection teams for of demining, and demining activities in line with the priorities of the BiH authorities. EU has so far supported these projects with €14.5 million.

Indirectly related to SALW programming, EUPM (the European Union Police Mission) which is responsible to the European Council, works to increase the competency of the police to a level comparable to the best European and international practices of policing. The EUPM does not have an executive mandate and does not perform any operational duties, such as investigations, and is therefore not directly involved in activities such as weapons collection. However, through its advisory function and as EUPM is promoting the collaboration between the police forces and EUFOR, its work might have an indirect impact on SALW control and ERW, especially through its representatives at the local police stations in both entities.<sup>35</sup>

EUPM has also had impact on SALW control measures through its PDG (Planning Development Guidance) directive No. 11, which clearly states the EUPM weapons policy that requires local BiH police compliance. PDG 11 defines the “conveyance, possession and storage of weapons, ammunitions, explosives and explosive devices by law enforcement agencies” in BiH. It also regulates the seizure and destruction procedures in cooperation with SFOR/EUFOR.<sup>36</sup>

The situation in BiH exemplifies the problem of lack of visibility of SALW and ERW components in EU-funded projects. Advice, or pressure, by EU bodies concerning SALW and ERW legislation constitutes in effect an indirect SALW control project. In a similar fashion, the proposed EU-funded (under CARDS) Integrated Border Management and “Support to BiH Police Force” is likely to include SALW or ERW capacity-building training.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, the funding by the



European Commission (under CARDS) of a gun owners database, in which all legally held weapons in BiH and their holders will be registered, is in effect, an SALW action.

SALW legislation in BiH is also generally influenced by the EU. EU pressure leads to harmonization of the respective laws: the draft law on arms and ammunition for the Federation of BiH in 2002 mentions the directive of the European Council on the control of procurement and possession of weapons from 1991 as main reason for the proposed changes to the law.<sup>38</sup> The same holds true for the BiH law on “Import and Export of the Weapons and Military Equipment” from December 2002 that names the EU stabilization and association process as a main reason for harmonization.

## Croatia

There are no EU projects in Croatia dealing specifically with SALW. However, on ERW the EU does support demining projects in the country through the CARDS programme (both regional CARDS funding and country specific).<sup>39</sup> Through CARDS 2001 and CARDS 2002, €2 million was allocated to demining operations in Croatia.<sup>40</sup> It is unlikely that demining projects do not also deal with ERW. However, so far, no clear distinction or separation between the two has been made.

The EU also funded an Integrated Border Management programme and civil society activities in Western Balkan countries. Both these activities could have had SALW components such as training, but we were unable to ascertain this. In general it seems that systematic knowledge or access to detailed data on all projects under CARDS is lacking in Brussels as well as in Zagreb. None of our informants were able to access data that could be systematically searched for relevant project components with direct or indirect impact on SALW or ERW.

As in BiH, however, the EU does have an impact on Croatia’s SALW/ERW policy through its pressure in terms of harmonization of SALW and ERW legislation during the EU accession process.

## The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

There are several EU missions in the country, although they do not have any projects dealing direct with SALW or ERW. The EU Special Representative and his supporting office have played a direct role in the political negotiations in that country, and have provided advice on several SALW projects, including NATO’s Operation Essential Harvest and the UNDP-led 2003 voluntary weapons collection programme.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the Monitoring Mission present in all Western Balkan countries played a minor role in monitoring the 2003 weapons collection campaign.

EU assistance in FYROM is managed by the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). While it has no specific SALW/ERW control activities, EAR does have several projects that indirectly impact national SALW policy, such as institutional reform of the police and the creation of the new border police unit. EAR projects also include the capacity development of the Ministry of Interior to enable them to combat illegal smuggling (including illegal weapons) across FYROM’s borders.<sup>42</sup>

A National Border Management Strategy, developed with assistance from the EU and approved by the Macedonian government in December 2003, has resulted in a review of legislation relating to border management. The EU also provides material support in the form of patrol vehicles and communications and data management equipment, as well as funding the

construction of the new border police headquarters. A total of €26.6 million (2000–2004) for border management projects in FRYOM have been committed by the EU.<sup>43</sup>

The EU Proxima Police Mission works with the Macedonian Ministry of Internal Affairs assisting and advising them on police reform. It does not, however, work directly on SALW projects. The Ministry, prodded by the Mission has issued a decree on the use of firearms and the two bodies are working together to update existing legislation on the use of force by police, in order to bring the legislation up to EU standards.<sup>44</sup>

As in other countries in the Western Balkans, motivation for putting SALW on the agenda might be explained by the EU requirements for harmonization of the *acquis communautaire*. The FYROM government had to answer the EU Accession Questionnaire in 2005. Several of the questions included in the inquiry required the Macedonian government to provide information on its SALW control policies and related defence policies. Most of these questions were included in the section covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and include questions on SALW, such as concerning trafficking, control strategies, organized crime and export controls. FYROM has just returned the official document providing its responses.<sup>45</sup>

### Serbia and Montenegro

EAR is responsible for EU assistance in Serbia and Montenegro as well. The focus of the EAR programme shifted from refugees, healthcare, energy, agriculture, and enterprise development in the first years after its establishment, to administrative issues, justice and home affairs. There are no projects with an SALW/ERW focus. However, projects concerning border management and fighting organized crime are activities in which SALW control and ERW probably play a role.

Through CARDS, Serbia and Montenegro have also received (separately) funds for various activities with potential impact on SALW and ERW or even a side component on such issues, that is, support to Civil Society/Strengthening NGOs, Integrated Border Management and Police Training.

### Kosovo

The EU is not implementing any projects with a direct impact on SALW in Kosovo. However it does support demining operations there, all of which are administered and coordinated through the UN Mine Action office in Kosovo.<sup>46</sup> Here too, it is likely that some activities concern ERW, though there is no record of such activities and they are not distinguished or noted in any reports.

## EU ASSISTANCE MECHANISMS

The EU assistance mechanism operates through a series of decision-making points and implementing organs, which do not always engage fully in the projects concerned. We were unable to trace the decision-making process in all cases, and some of the information here will serve as paradigmatic for the process. Both the Council of the EU and the Commission affect SALW activity in the Balkans, directly and indirectly, as we note briefly below.

Directly, the Council mandates EUFOR, which is controlled by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) that exercises political control and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) that



monitors its execution. The Commission, implementing Council decisions, funds SEESAC and the NATO PfP project in Albania (see below), both concerned directly with SALW control.

Indirectly, the Commission affects SALW principally through the EC Delegations, CARDS and possibly through EAR. The Council may have an effect on SALW issues through the nomination of the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), as they are also involved in developing CFSP policies and contributions in the host country.

### EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECT ACTIVITIES: SEESAC AND NATO PfP IN ALBANIA

In the European Commission, DG Relex is responsible for the Commission's participation in the CFSP and ensures that it has a clear identity and a coherent approach in its external activities. It works closely with EuropeAid, Europe's main actor for implementation of the external aid instruments of the European Commission, which are funded by the European Community budget and the European Development Fund. DG Relex is responsible for multi-year planning and programming in the region. Annual programming and responsibility for the phases of the project cycle is with EuropeAid.<sup>47</sup>

DG Relex reserves about €3–4 million per year for SALW-related projects.<sup>48</sup> While four are currently funded, only two of them are in the Western Balkans: SEESAC and the NATO Partnership for Peace SALW ammunition destruction project in Albania.<sup>49</sup> DG Relex is apparently uncertain about the exact number of projects with SALW/ERW component financed by DG Relex/CARDS.

In the case of Joint Actions (NATO PfP in Albania, SEESAC), the funding process was as follows:

- the respective institutions applied for funds;
- their proposals were discussed in the Council's Working Group on Global Arms Control and Disarmament;
- after approval they were transmitted to the DG Relex advisors with an attached financing sheet provided by the principle administrator in DG Relex;
- from there they went to the committee of member states' permanent representatives to the EU and to the Council for approval; and
- the Council then decided on the implementation of a Joint Action, which formed the basis for financing out of the Commission's budget.<sup>50</sup>

### SEESAC support

EU support for SEESAC is based on Council Decision 2002/842/CFSP of 21 October 2002 concerning the implementation of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002. Whereby, the Commission is entrusted with the implementation of the Council Decision. The relevant Council bodies will be informed on the implementation of the Decision through reports provided by the Commission. These reports are mainly based on regular reports from UNDP. Financial assistance, aimed at contributing to the staff costs of SEESAC, is given to UNDP in accordance with Title II of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP in form of a grant.<sup>51</sup>

Council decision 2002/842/CFSP has been extended and amended twice since: by Council Decision 2003/807/CFSP of 17 November 2003, and by Council Decision 2004/791/CFSP of 22 November 2004. The duration of the financing has been extended to 31 December 2005, and

the financial amount has been increased to a total of €830,000. The extension and increase of funding was due to the fact that some objectives had not been attained by the original expiry date, and others were to be consolidated and expanded.<sup>52</sup>

UNDP and the Stability Pact recommend in a joint mid-term assessment that SEESAC enters a new two-year phase, Phase 2 (January 2005–December 2006), to ensure the continuation of SEESAC's work.<sup>53</sup>

### Support to NATO PfP project in Albania

The decision process concerning EU support for the PfP Trust Fund project in Albania through the NAMSA is similar to the one for SEESAC. The basis is Council Decision 2003/276/CFSP of 14 April 2003 concerning the implementation of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002. Again, the Commission has been given the responsibility for the implementation of the Council decision. The Commission will also provide reports to inform the relevant Council bodies on the implementation of the Decision. The reports are mainly based on regular reports from NAMSA. Financial assistance is given to the project in Albania in Accordance with Title II of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP in form of a grant.<sup>54</sup>

On 22 November 2004, Council decision 2003/276/CFSP was extended and amended by Council Decision 2004/790/CFSP. The duration of the financing has been extended to 31 December 2005, and an additional €500,000 have been provided. The reason for the increase in funding was again that some objectives had not yet been attained by the expiry date of decision 2003/276/CFSP, and others were to be consolidated and further expanded.<sup>55</sup>

Estimated overall costs of the project over a four-year period are €6,400,000.<sup>56</sup>

## INDIRECT SALW CONTROL ASSISTANCE

### CARDS

The Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization programme was established in 2000 to channel aid to the Western Balkans region.<sup>57</sup> Its main objective is to assist countries in the Stabilization and Association Process in the Western Balkans to progress towards EU membership. The Stabilization and Association Process and multi-annual planning in the region fall under the responsibility of the Directorate General of Enlargement.

Potential activities under CARDS are not restricted to economic measures but, due to its wide mandate, leave room for activities that could also include SALW- or ERW-related inputs.

SALW problems are noted in the budget proposal, though CARDS concentrates on enhancing human security in general in (post-)conflict situations.<sup>58</sup> It is possible that SALW or ERW components could have been supported previously under CARDS, but this has not been documented, inasmuch as SALW funds had not been envisaged under CARDS.<sup>59</sup>

Between 2002 and 2004, €197 million of CARDS programme overall funds were allocated to the development of regional programmes. Although among the main areas of intervention there was no programme directly dedicated to SALW and ERW control, there are some that might include an SALW/ERW component, such as the Twinning Programme, the programme on

Promoting Integrated Border Management, programmes on Policing and Organised Crime, and in the support of civil society groups.

The Awareness and Risk Education Project run by Saferworld has been funded via CARDS to develop the capacity of civil society to conduct SALW awareness education in the region. This is the one CARDS-funded direct SALW programme in the region. The project received funding for a period of 18 months starting April 2005. Total budget is approximately €320,000, of which €120,000 comes from Saferworld and other donors. It will take place in four countries: Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FYROM.

Three aspects are covered:

- support for core institutional development activities from a range of non-governmental organizations (both grass roots and research);
- a civic community plan at the micro-level to develop and improve security enhancement; and
- support for strengthening the local non-governmental organization network.

### The European Agency for Reconstruction

The European Agency for Reconstruction is responsible for EU assistance in Serbia and Montenegro and in FYROM.<sup>60</sup> In 2004, the European Commission (EC) assistance funds delegated to the EAR amounted to some €315 million. Since 2000, a total of €2.3 billion has been provided for EAR programmes.<sup>61</sup>

EAR does not support any focused SALW or ERW projects. However, some of their projects may have an SALW/ERW component, for example, the Integrated Border Management Programme in Macedonia.

### Indirect influence of EC delegation offices and EU Special Representatives

EC delegation offices in the Balkans, and EU Special Representatives are also involved in aid programs that have impact on SALW. There is no consistent practice concerning the independence or scope of work of the EC delegation offices on the Balkans. The scope and responsibility depend on the country the delegation is working in and on local arrangements. In FYROM and Serbia and Montenegro, the project management and administration is directed through Brussels, leaving the country office little room for input into the project cycle. The other offices of the delegations of the EU Commission operating in the Western Balkans, that is, Croatia, BiH, and Albania, are a bit more independent regarding the administering of projects. However, even they often do not seem to be well informed about SALW activities and refer requests for information to Brussels.<sup>62</sup>

The EU delegation office in FYROM is primarily concerned with overseeing EU accession talks and technical assistance to the host country. The Delegation also coordinates information for this purpose from the five other EU organizations operating currently in Macedonia. EAR is now primarily responsible for implementing EU assistance projects in Macedonia.

## The Special Case of the EUSR in Macedonia

The overall mandate of EUSRs in the Balkans has been crisis management. However, in the case of Macedonia the EUSR plays an important role in coordinating the responses and acting as political head of all other EU missions. The EUSR was also involved in the preparation and shaping of several EU missions to FYROM, including the EUFOR Concordia mission and the EUPM Proxima mission, and in preparation and shaping of the 2001 Operation Essential Harvest and Ohrid Framework Agreement.

While there are no EU projects in Macedonia that are specifically focused on small arms, the EU has been involved in several projects with indirect impact on SALW in the country. On all subjects the EUSR offers its advice and uses its political weight to push for reforms. In the case of the 2003 weapons collection, the office had apparently agreed to the plan for a weapons collection and had “tasked” the UNDP to implement the programme. The decision to select UNDP for the task was based on their assessed competence. The EUSR was also able to push the FYROM government on behalf of the project whenever needed. So, while the UNDP presented the front or public face of the weapons collection programme, the EUSR worked behind the scenes offering political support to the project and, when necessary, applying political pressure to the FYROM government to go along with the project. During the actual collection, the EU Monitoring Mission, the EUFOR Concordia Mission, and staff of various EU embassies worked as monitors of the weapons collection sites. “Showing the EU flag” at collection sites was meant as a confidence-building measure to show civilians that the weapons collection sites were being observed and monitored. The monitors also submitted reports to the municipal commission in charge of the local weapons collection sites and to the UNDP. The UNDP, in turn, provided evaluation and monitoring reports to SEESAC and the International Working Group on Arms as well as the EU organizations.

Well before and throughout the weapons collection campaign, the EUSR was part of the International Working Group on Arms in FYROM. This international working group is chaired by the UNDP (as the agency with the lead in weapons collection) and consists of the EUSR, a NATO liaison office, the US Embassy, OSCE and the EU Proxima Police Mission.

As the direct EU liaison in the country to the FYROM government, the EUSR has also been actively giving advice and encouraging the adoption of the new Law on Arms, which was recently ratified by the Parliament and published in the official Gazette in January. Similarly the EUSR is now encouraging the FYROM government and Ministry of Interior to destroy collected and seized weapons.

The EUSR and EUPM are also pushing the Ministry of Interior to adopt the proper administration to appropriately manage, track and trace collected and seized weapons in order to prevent their diversion back into the illegal markets. Most of these negotiations are conducting through the UNDP SACIM (Small Arms Control in Macedonia) project,<sup>63</sup> but again with the political support and weight of the EUSR behind it.

## ANALYSIS OF EU ACTION: PROJECT PLANNING, EVALUATION AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Our overall findings indicate that, there is no structured project planning by the EU on SALW or ERW in the Western Balkans. Moreover, with the exception of specific SALW/ERW

programmes such as SEESAC and NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, there have been no evaluation or impact assessment on SALW or ERW conducted by the EU, nor have SALW/ERW issues been highlighted in any of the general evaluations of EU programmes such as CARDS.

As can be seen from examining the evaluative practices detailed below, each programme and organization does conduct evaluation of their actions, but the results do not feed back into a broader EU picture. SEESAC and the NATO PfP Trust Fund have both carried out extensive internally driven evaluations of their own processes. The evaluations detail the efficacy and internal operations of these projects (which are EU funded, but not EU controlled). Any evaluation of the degree to which these programmes contribute to the overall EU policy on SALW/ERW in the region has not been accomplished. This is not to say that these (or other projects) do not engage in professional evaluation. It is however the case that the EU makes no attempt, beyond formal accounting and reporting demands, to evaluate the efficacy of these programmes as part of an overall strategy. Moreover, we were unable to uncover evidence that would show that the results of each individual programme's evaluation were fed systematically into the decision-making framework at the Council or Commission level.

UNDP usually designs and formulates its projects and then submits these proposals to donor organizations, such as SEESAC. The donor's suggestions and advice are taken into account, but the planning and implementation is with UNDP, though UNDP does cooperate with other international and national organizations and civil society groups in implementation.

Evaluation is done according to the terms of the specific agreement concerned. Results of the evaluation and lessons learned are taken into consideration in UNDP's design of subsequent projects.<sup>64</sup> The results are fed into follow-up projects, such as SACIM 2 (which is financed by the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery).<sup>65</sup>

The EU requires an annual progress and financial report from SEESAC. Additionally, the EU receives a financial report from the UNDP office in Brussels. SEESAC also provides the EU with its biennial report, which is an informal financial report sent to all donors.<sup>66</sup> An evaluation visit of an EU representative in May 2003 resulted in the expansion of EU contributions in 2004.<sup>67</sup> Otherwise, the EC followed UNDP's evaluation of SEESAC's performance regarding continuing funding.<sup>68</sup>

In Albania, NAMSA is responsible for the whole project cycle of its SALW ammunition destruction project. The overall project management, procurement and finance responsibilities are with NAMSA, situated in Capellen, Luxembourg. They are assisted by an in-country supervision team. NAMSA developed the project proposal and negotiated with potential donors. They are responsible for the overall financial management and contracting. These contracts include technical, financial and management training for key members at the ULP-Mjekes factory, where the SALW destruction work will be carried out.<sup>69</sup>

NAMSA will also help to ensure a smooth implementation of the project through the in-country team, which supervises and implements the project. The project requested financial support from the EC, and funding was decided by the EU Council. The third round of funding is currently in process but has not yet been determined nor agreed on.<sup>70</sup> Here too, there is no feedback into the decision-making process at the EU level.

CARDS project proposals are evaluated by the EC delegations who also identify potential projects and implement them.<sup>71</sup> The CARDS programme has been evaluated in a report on the

implementation of regulation 2666/2000 (CARDS): EC Support to the Western Balkans, which was submitted to the Council in 2004 by the authors, Development Researcher's Network Consortium, following the requirement of Article 13 of the regulation. The report covers the period from the adoption of the regulation in 2000 until the end of 2003. The objective of the evaluation was "to provide the European Commission with an independent and reliable assessment of the assistance strategy under CARDS and its evolution within its wider political setting".<sup>72</sup> The assessment was carried out in three phases:

- desk analysis and outline of the main issues;
- field-based wide consultation of the main stakeholders in each country/entity; and
- synthesis phase.

Apart from evaluating CARDS, the three volume report also provides lessons learned for future programming and delivery of assistance, and suggestions for the future of the regulation and legal amendments needing to be made for it.

A similar evaluation report on EAR was submitted to the EU in 2004 by the Development Researcher's Network, covering the period from 2000 until the end of 2003. The same three phases assessment has been applied. The report also gives recommendations on the future status of EAR.<sup>73</sup>

The weakness of the splintered approach adopted by the EU is apparent when the programmes are looked at as a whole. Individually, each programme is carefully scrutinized, monitored, and professionally (and thoroughly) evaluated. However, we found no evidence that any evaluation process—first hand, with a team in the field assessing the specific question of SALW, or even second hand, where a team gleans SALW-related material from individual program evaluations—was being carried out to assess EU SALW action as a whole. Partly this derives from the splintering of authority and the multiplicity of bodies engaged in security and stabilization work in the Western Balkans. Partly it derives from the absence of any one body assuming (or charged with) responsibility for SALW issues. Other factors include the lack of technical understanding of SALW issues within the decisive bodies, the Commission and the Council; and perhaps the absence of an "advocate" within the EU structure for SALW action.

As a consequence of this approach, SALW issues are approached with what seems like a series of uncoordinated efforts where the success of one programme is unrelated to others, and where effort cannot be focused.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EUROPEAN ACTION

### CONCLUSIONS

The EU is, in effect, a major donor for SALW control in the Western Balkans. It funds much of SEESAC and supports arms and ammunition control in Albania (first through SALWC and now on a smaller scale through NAMSA). The EU is also a donor for civil society capacity-development in the Western Balkans through a programme undertaken by Saferworld. The EU also engages in many other projects that have an impact on SALW control. Here it is difficult to estimate the financial input since the SALW element is rarely explicit. We also feel there may well be SALW elements in other programmes that have not been documented or reported on simply because the implementers and evaluators were concerned with the major aspects of their programme, not



with embedded SALW consequences. Significantly, SALW elements are rarely clearly identified from the programmes within which they are embedded.

Moreover, in the apparent absence of a coherent SALW strategy (and consequently, little chance of evaluating the efficacy of SALW action), EU action on SALW does not benefit from mutual support that one programme can offer another (lessons learned, cooperative action, supplementing activities). It is also significant that we could find no evidence that the EU had engaged in any way in impact assessment. Impact assessments are carried out by SEESAC, for instance, but there is no coherent analysis of how these disparate programmes (and parts thereof) affect the SALW picture.

The broad conclusions in the paragraphs above can be broken down into six detailed observations:

#### The set-up and structure of EU projects:

##### Lack of coordinated EU policy or strategy at the institutional level

The formal set-up and structure of the SEESAC and NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund projects are fully documented and available from the respective organizations. However, the ways in which different funding mechanisms have been utilized for a coherent policy on SALW control in the Balkans is far from clear. Two EU bodies—the Commission and the Council—appear to operate SALW funding in rather different ways, and with what appears to be little coordination. The picture is even more blurred by potential activities under CARDS and EAR. To add to the problem, since there are no clear guidelines, and since expertise on SALW programmes is lacking within the EUSR offices and the country delegations, much of the day-to-day operation, as well as managing the project, is left to other bodies, whether in Brussels, Luxembourg, or in-country. As a result, SALW programmes are run in different ways, by different bodies, using different lines of control.

##### Insufficient technical capacity in Brussels to assess, develop, monitor and evaluate SALW control interventions of interest to the EU

The most critical factor in undertaking or monitoring SALW-specific programmes in the Western Balkans appears to be that the EU central bodies lack expertise in the technical aspects of SALW control programmes. If the EU wants to increase its influence on SALW control there—for example through the accession process—it needs technical expertise. The EU's authorization for SALW projects appears to be mainly based on political criteria. As a direct result of the lack of technical expertise, and consequent lack of potential for overview of the project cycle, there appears to be no coherent, focused body of knowledge about SALW control in the Western Balkans.

##### Insufficient evaluation and impact assessment

With some exceptions, notably the UNDP FYROM SALW programme, and an evaluation of SEESAC, there appeared to be little substantive evaluation of the EU's SALW control measures in the Western Balkans. Implementing bodies on the ground have carried out evaluations of their activities, but there is no evidence that the results of these evaluations fed into the EU decision-making process on SALW. Financial reporting presumably did take place, but this does not compensate for the lack of substantive programme evaluation, that should have been carried out by some office with technical capacity for this kind of work. In practice, the EU bodies with

overall responsibility for SALW programmes contented themselves with reliance on the internal evaluations carried out by the programmes themselves.

Insofar as impact assessment goes, we could find no evidence that the EU engaged in any form of impact assessment concerning its SALW programmes. There was, in fact, little evidence of any planning for impact assessment, nor of any interest in such an exercise on the part of the EU. Programmes were assessed on the basis of their proper accounting, and of their formal procedures. Little thought was apparently given to whether, and how, they brought about changes on the ground.

There appears to be little feedback from the programmes into further funding or implementation cycles. Project funding was, apparently, decided on the basis of an assessment of the implementer's capacities (often quite impressive, as the choice of UNDP in FYROM shows), but without any input from either impact assessment or substantive evaluation.

### Poor information flow

Even within the agencies most concerned with SALW control in the EU, there is a lack of knowledge about the programmes they themselves finance. In practice this means that the smaller SALW projects, or SALW components of West Balkan assistance programmes (even in the security sector), were unknown at the EU level (whatever the case on the ground). The problem of information is so acute that we found that at times people working on the same programme do not share knowledge of projects they are concerned with.

The lack of knowledge about programs derives directly from two factors: lack of access to relevant records on the one hand, and the fact that personnel responsible at the EU level were constantly being rotated (and, in fact, were in the process of being rotated while the research was in progress).

In practice, we managed to find no or little evidence of a "corporate memory" concerning SALW control: indexed and accessible records. There is no central archive, nor, for that matter any indexed way of retrieving information about past EU activities on small arms. In practice, documentary evidence is not indexed, and retrieving such information depends on individual filing systems and practices.

Moreover, not only were personnel rotated, but responsibility for programme implementation was also in flux (for example, EuropeAid had divested itself of responsibility for these programmes in favour of the Directorate General of Enlargement, without, apparently transferring any of the corporate memory).

### Confusion over responsibilities, and lack of clarity concerning lines of control

The European Commission and the Council both engage in SALW action in the Western Balkans and by operating through different mechanisms seem to be working in parallel. At lower levels, this multiple approach is also visible. EC Delegations and EUSRs operate in parallel (albeit, in different countries) each with different interpretations of their mandates, and without an overall common policy on SALW. It seems that the different scopes of these efforts sometimes depend on little more than personal connections and people occupying a particular office. As a consequence, information and instructions seem to cross lines, and there appears to be no coherent policy, nor implementation of existing policies. For example, the Delegation of the European Commission in



Belgrade was unable to offer any information on programming since projects in Serbia and Montenegro are administered directly from Brussels.<sup>74</sup> The same is not true in other areas, where projects are locally administered.

- There is no central office or focal point for information (technical or general) on ongoing EU-supported SALW and ERW activities. In effect, no single agency or office in the EU appears to be aware of the state of play concerning SALW/ERW activities in the Western Balkans.
- Two central bodies—the EU Commission and the EU Council—are running parallel, and potentially conflicting, programmes, which have an impact on SALW/ERW (even if they are not targeted specifically at such programmes).

### Lack of clear definitions and contextual discriminations

Many programmes in the Western Balkans do not isolate and identify SALW components in their activities. Many of our informants indicated that they had a feeling that this or the other programme needed, or actively incorporated, SALW control elements as a necessary factor in their success. However, either because of legal restrictions (the programme brief had made no mention of SALW, and therefore, financial justification was lacking) or because the SALW element was so closely intertwined with other elements, they were unable to clearly pinpoint these elements.

The same was true of ERW issues. In neither demining nor most SALW activities was there any explicit mention of ERW. We know from anecdotal evidence, as well as from informal reports, that both demining and SALW collection and destruction programmes had, of necessity and opportunity, to deal with ERW. Yet this is in no way reflected in programme planning, proposals, or evaluation in any distinct way.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Following the observations made in the study, as summarized above, a few specific recommendations emerge. They constitute a distillation of both best practice and the conclusions we drew during the process of researching and writing this report.

### Need to establish a Focal Point or system for EU SALW control activities

It seems obvious to us that in order to produce a coherent policy on SALW, the EU needs to have some form of central focus for all SALW programming. This is perhaps the major recommendation to offer and, by and large, the solution to the major problems described above is likely to be overcome by this device. A lesser option would be to have one focal point for the Council and a different one for the Commission as the coordination of these two bodies seems, as yet, not to be sufficiently coherent.

Whether or not such a focal point (which the UN recommends for national entities in implementing the UN Programme of Action on SALW) should implement programmes, fund them, review and evaluate them or perform other functions, depends on EU practice.

However, such a focal point should have:

- the ability to collect all information concerning SALW control projects funded or implemented by the EU, and all SALW elements even of programmes that are not SALW focused; and
- the mandate to disseminate, and the responsibility to make publicly available, all information on EU SALW control projects/elements of projects, and to provide self-initiated and on-demand overviews and details of these projects.

In addition, best practice suggests that this focal point might also be the main professional body tasked with:

- technical assessment of SALW proposals (ideally, without going into policy or financial recommendations);
- substantive evaluation of running programmes according to universally agreed on evaluation best practices, including commissioning evaluations by bodies not connected to implementation; and
- impact assessments of EU SALW control projects and the SALW components of projects not otherwise concerned principally with SALW control.

#### Need for a more structured SALW and ERW policy in the Western Balkans

We would also suggest that as the Western Balkans and their SALW and ERW problems clearly have an impact on Europe, the EU should think about a more structured and intensified approach regarding SALW and ERW in the region. The current process is extremely incoherent, with different organizational entities within the EU operating without any clear overall policy, and without any planned intra-Balkan synergy. We feel that SALW and ERW should be a priority for the EU in the Western Balkans since they have enormous potential for harm and for destabilization of the area. As such, they should be visible in all phases of the project cycle, from SALW- and ERW-dedicated budget lines, through impact and evaluative reporting.

#### Explicit noting of SALW in projects that might have an SALW impact

We strongly suggest that projects in the Balkans funded through the various EU mechanisms should highlight (whether in the form of a rider or appendix, or as a formal section) SALW control issues that need to be addressed, as well as indicating the degree to which these projects affect SALW control. Obviously not all programmes would have much to do with SALW, but the ability to evaluate SALW action is almost directly related to the clear statement of the issues, how they are to be tackled, and by whom.

#### Instituting formal pan-EU evaluation, impact assessment, and review procedures

The EU Commission and the Council should take responsibility for ensuring that SALW practices are documented through a regular process of internal evaluation of SALW control related activities. The same should be done to assess the impact of such activities within the Western Balkans. Finally, some mechanism must be worked out to review this information and feed it back into the decision-making mechanism within the EU.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> One such recent example is the FYROM Government's answers to the EU Accession Questionnaire. Several of the questions included in the inquiry required the government to provide information on its SALW control policies and related defence policies. Most of these questions were included in the section covering the CFSP. The questionnaire is available online at <<http://www.sei.gov.mk/prasalnik/>>.
- <sup>2</sup> CFSP Action Profile, <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/fin/actions/seesa.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/fin/actions/seesa.htm)>.
- <sup>3</sup> Source: The Implementation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy Actions (CFSP), 22nd report covering the period 1 October–31 December 2004.
- <sup>4</sup> Background Brief of SEESAC Activities (2004/2005) for CODUN Group.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>6</sup> Source: The Implementation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy Actions (CFSP), 22nd report covering the period 1 October–31 December 2004.
- <sup>7</sup> See BBC Monitoring Service: "EU to Help Finance Programme to Control Weapons in Albania".
- <sup>8</sup> Council of the European Union, *Decision 2003/276/CFSP of 14 April 2003 Concerning the Implementation of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a View to a European Union Contribution to the Destruction of Ammunition for Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania*, EU document 2003/276/CFSP, 14 April 2003.
- <sup>9</sup> CFSP Action Profile, <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/fin/actions/seesa.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/fin/actions/seesa.htm)>.
- <sup>10</sup> Council of the European Union, *Decision 2004/790/CFSP of 22 November 2004 Extending and Amending Decision 2003/276/CFSP Implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a View to a European Union Contribution to the Destruction of Ammunition for Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania*, EU document 2004/790/CFSP, 22 November 2004.
- <sup>11</sup> Project document with description provided by Gunther Manthey, DG Relex.
- <sup>12</sup> E-mail correspondence with Klaas Los, Project Manager, Operations Section 1, EC Delegation Albania, 13 April 2005.
- <sup>13</sup> Authority was transferred and EUFOR launched on 2 December 2004.
- <sup>14</sup> The EUFOR mission is under the command of the EU Military Committee, which is overseen by the European Council and not by the European Commission.
- <sup>15</sup> Harvest is a generic name for weapons collection operations.
- <sup>16</sup> See <<http://www.euforbih.org/history/history.htm>>.
- <sup>17</sup> See <<http://www.euforbih.org/forum/003/p05a/tefp05a.htm>>.
- <sup>18</sup> Beth Kampschror, "EUFOR Continues SFOR's Operation Harvest", *Southeast European Times*, 31 January 2005.
- <sup>19</sup> E-mail correspondence with Capt. Jan Willem Francke, Public Information Office, EUFOR headquarters, Sarajevo, 6 May 2005.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., 24 March 2005.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., 6 May 2005.
- <sup>22</sup> See <<http://www.euforbih.org/sheets/fs050225a.htm>>.
- <sup>23</sup> E-mail correspondence with Capt. Jan Willem Francke, Public Information Office, EUFOR headquarters, Sarajervo, 24 March 2005.
- <sup>24</sup> E-mail correspondence with Lawrence Doczy, 25 April 2005.
- <sup>25</sup> See "Support to Security Sector Reform - SSSR (May 2003 - December 2007)", <<http://www.undp.org.al/?projects,38>>.
- <sup>26</sup> E-mail correspondence with Klaas Los, Project Manager, Operations Section 1, EC Delegation Albania, 13 April 2005.
- <sup>27</sup> E-mail correspondence with Lawrence Doczy, 25 April 2005.
- <sup>28</sup> See "The European Union's Stabilization missions in South-east Europe", <[http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions\\_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1859.html - P201\\_37504](http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1859.html - P201_37504)>.
- <sup>29</sup> E-mail correspondence with Klaas Los, Project Manager, Operations Section 1, EC Delegation Albania, 13 April 2005.
- <sup>30</sup> See "Albanian Mine Action Program (AMAP)—Capacity Building Project", <<http://www.undp.org.al/?projects,26>>.

- 31 Council of the European Union, *Common Position of 26 February 1996 Defined by the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union Concerning Arms Exports to the Former Yugoslavia*, EU document 96/184/CFSP, 26 February 1996; and Council of the European Union, *Decision of 19 July 1999 Amending Common Position 96/184/CFSP Concerning Arms Exports to the Former Yugoslavia*, EU document 1999/481/CFSP, 19 July 1999.
- 32 E-mail correspondence with Amna Berbic, UNDP BiH Project Manager, 18 August 2005.
- 33 E-mail correspondence with Nedim Catovic, UNDP BiH, 22 April 2005.
- 34 E-mail Correspondence with EU Commission Delegation in BiH.
- 35 Communication with Kilian Wahl, European Commission press officer, BiH, 22 April 2005.
- 36 Source: documents provided to BICC for the Small Arms Survey in BiH, conducted in 2004.
- 37 Source: evaluation of the Assistance to Balkan Countries under Regulation 2666/2000, June 2004.
- 38 Draft law documents were provided to the authors during the research for the Small Arms Survey BiH in 2004.
- 39 Telephone conversation with the Secretary of the Operations Department of the European Commission Delegation in Zagreb, 10 March 2005.
- 40 E-mail correspondence with Alfons Peeters, European Commission Delegation to Croatia, 21 March 2005. See also <<http://www.delhrv.cec.eu.int/en/item1/topic1.htm>>.
- 41 Interview with Constantin Cakioussis, Political Advisor to the EUSR, Skopje, 17 March 2005.
- 42 Communication with Danielle Kostovska, EAR, 8 March 2005.
- 43 See <<http://www.ear.eu.int/yugo/yugo.htm>>.
- 44 Communication with Hans Fritzheimer and Robert Wood, EU Proxima Police Mission, 3 February 2005.
- 45 Communication with Etienne de Perier, ELARGE, 21 March 2005.
- 46 E-mail correspondence with the staff of the European Commission liaison office and EAR staff in Kosovo.
- 47 See <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/cards/foreword\\_p\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/cards/foreword_p_en.htm)>.
- 48 In 2003, the contribution amounted to €3,256,953.
- 49 The other two projects are the EU–ASAC project in Cambodia and support for the UN–LiREC centre in Peru.
- 50 E-mail correspondence with Gunther Manthey, DG Relex, European Commission, 1 April 2005.
- 51 Council of the European Union, *Decision 2003/276/CFSP of 14 April 2003 Concerning the Implementation of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a View to a European Union Contribution to the Destruction of Ammunition for Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania*, EU document 2003/276/CFSP, 14 April 2003.
- 52 Council of the European Union, *Council Decision 2003/807/CFSP of 17 November 2003 Extending and Amending Decision 2002/842/CFSP Concerning the Implementation of Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a View to a European Union Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons in South East Europe*, EU document 2003/807/CFSP, 17 November 2003; and Council of the European Union, *Decision 2004/790/CFSP of 22 November 2004 Extending and Amending Decision 2003/276/CFSP Implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a View to a European Union Contribution to the Destruction of Ammunition for Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania*, EU document 2004/790/CFSP, 22 November 2004.
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## ACRONYMS

BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DG Relex	Directorate General for External Relations
EAR	European Agency for Reconstruction
EC	European Commission
ERW	explosive remnants of war
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Force in the Balkans
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUSR	EU Special Representative
FYROM	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
LOT	Liaison and Observation Team
MAC	Mine Action Centre
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAMECA	Police Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania
PDG	Planning Development Guidance
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SACBIH	Small Arms Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SACIM	Small Arms Control in Macedonia
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SALWC	Small Arms and Light Weapons Control
SAP	Small Arms Project
SEESAC	South East Europe Regional Clearinghouse for Small Arms Reduction
SFOR	Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SP	Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe
SSSR	Support to Security Sector Reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

