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DDR Programme in Aceh Indonesia 2005-2006

Aim

To present a brief overview of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme within the context of post-Tsunami reconstruction and democratisation in Aceh Indonesia.

Map of Aceh



Key Facts on Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD)

- Area: 55,392 square km or 2.89% of Indonesia
- Population: 4,218,486 (December 2004); 4,031,589 (after Tsunami)
- GDP 2005-2006: Rp 28.5 trillion (the 3rd largest in Indonesia)
- People below poverty line: 28.5% before Tsunami, 41.5% after Tsunami (the 4th largest in Indonesia)
- People: 10 ethnic groups are considered to be the indigenous: Aceh, Gayo, Alas, Aneuk Jamee, Melayu Tamiang, Kluet, Devayan, Sigulai, Haloban, Julu. Others came from foreign countries such as Arab, India, China, and other parts of Indonesia.
- Language: bahasa Indonesia (official), Aceh, Gayo, Simeulue, and others.
- Religion: Islam (97.6%), Christian (1.7%), Hindu (0.08%), Budha (0.55%)
- Government: 18 kabupaten, 1 kotamadya, 1 kotif, 454 kecamatan, 5,862 gampong (village)
- Aceh's speciality lies on the enforcement of *sharia* or Islamic law within the province, which differs from other provinces in Indonesia.

Key Facts on Indonesia

Name: Republic of Indonesia (Indonesia) Capital: Jakarta	Area: 1,919,440 square km
People: Population: 245,452,739 (CIA World book, 2006)	Life expectancy at birth: male 67.42 years, female 72.45 years.
Population growth rate: 1.41% (CIA World Book, 2006)	Religions: Muslim 88%, Protestant 5%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 2%, Buddhist 1%, other 1%.
Languages: Bahasa Indonesia (official), English, Dutch, local dialects, the most widely spoken is Javanese	Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 570,000 Tsunami victims, 500,000 conflict victims in Aceh, Central Kalimantan, Maluku and Central Sulawesi
Economy: GDP(purchasing power parity): \$ 869.7 billion (World Bank, 2005) GDP growth rate: 5.6 % (World Bank, 2005) Industries: petroleum and natural gas, manufacturing, mining, plywood, rubber, food, tourism. Imports: machinery and equipment, chemicals, fuels, foodstuffs. Annual Inflation: 10.5% (World Bank 2005) % of population below national poverty line: 16.7% (2004)	GDP per capita (PPP): \$3,600 (CIA World Book, 2005) Unemployment rate: 11.8% (2005) Agriculture: rice, cassava (tapioca) peanuts, rubber, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, copra; poultry, beef, pork, eggs. Exports: oil and gas, electrical appliances, plywood, textiles, rubber Economic aid recipient: \$ 43 billion External debt: \$ 135 billion
Security Forces: Police: Polisi Republik Indonesia (Polri):	Military: Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)

Background and Setting

The history of Aceh is a story of bloodshed. War began in 1520 against the Portuguese who attempted to take control of Malacca. Following two centuries of peace, war against the Dutch (1873-1904) took place as the activation of Suez Canal boosted the importance of the Malacca Straits for the international merchants. Exhausted by Aceh's perpetual struggle, the Dutch employed Dr Snouk Hurgonye, who worked in disguise for two years analysing the local culture and the role of religion. He developed tactics which proved to be successful: to divide and inflict the powers that built the tapestry of Acehnese social system: *sultan*, aristocrats (*uleebalang*) and religious leader (*ulama*). The Dutch maintained its power until the Japanese arrived. Aceh then fell under Japanese occupation (1943-1945) before eventually joining the independent Indonesian Federal Republic.

When Indonesia proclaimed independence from the Dutch, Aceh was divided: the *ulama* wanted to support the new country whilst the local leaders felt that the return of Dutch colonialism would be beneficial. The War of Cumbok (1945) marked the defeat of the *uleebalang* by the *ulama* which shifted the balance of power in Aceh. The spirit of revolution spread to the Sumatra Island and Aceh supported independence movements in other areas. The transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch finally took place in 1949.

The conflict in Aceh Indonesia, although labelled primarily as a separatist movement, is a war about a series of broken promises - a combination of economic exploitation

leading to gross underdevelopment of the province, and human rights abuses against the Aceh people.ⁱ Aceh's first campaign for separation (1953-1962) was led by Darul Islam ('House of Islam') rebels from Java who tried to establish an Islamic State. The Acehnese supported this movement and in 1959 Jakarta gave Aceh special autonomy status.

When General Suharto came into power (1967-1998) he followed in the steps of his predecessor and neglected the agreement on special autonomy for Aceh between Darul Islam and former President Sukarno. President Suharto encouraged major investment from Exxon Mobil and Shell to exploit Aceh's mineral resources, but the indigenous population was never adequately involved in the planning of Aceh's development and therefore the financial benefit was felt by few. Resentment resulted in a second separatism campaign which was launched in 1976, led by Hasan di Tiro, descendant of respected ulama. Tiro led the armed resistance group Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM - Free Aceh Movement) but in the late 1970s, Indonesian authorities conducted mass arrests of GAM members and executed many of its leaders. In the late 1980s GAM re-emerged to popular support and President Suharto declared the province a Military Operational Area (Daerah Operasi Militer, or DOM).

After the Asian Financial Crisis and Suharto's downfall in May 1998, the Acehnese people had high hopes for a new start with demilitarisation and democracy. Suharto's vice president, Habibie took over office and scaled back the activities of the security forces and lifted the DOM restrictions. President Abdurrahman Wahid took office in 1999 and opened a dialogue to peace. The Henry Dunant Centre/Humanitarian Dialogue Centre (HDC) brokered negotiations between the government and GAM which produced, in May 2000, a 'Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh'. The agreement was weak and there was a general violation by both the government of Indonesia (GoI) and GAM. In March 2001, the president gave his authority to launch a military operation against GAM.

In July 2001 Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of first President Sukarno) came to power and introduced Law No.18/2001 granting Aceh special autonomy as the province of *Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam*. She also began peace talks which resulted in the signing of CoHA (Cessation of Hostilities Agreement) in December 2002, however, the agreement was frequently violated and GAM refused to disarm. Immediately after the talks ended on May 19 2003 president Megawati declared Martial law in Aceh. The martial law was lifted 12 months later and replaced by civil emergency status on May 19, 2004.

The first Indonesian presidential election chose General SB Yudhoyono as president and Jusuf Kalla as his vice. The vice president actively initiated peace talks and continuously maintains communication with GAM leaders. When the Tsunami struck on December 26, 2004, both the GoI and GAM suffered major disruption. Approximately 130,000 people died, 37,000 people are missing, and 192,000 have become IDPsⁱⁱ. Violence between the TNI/Polri and GAM drastically reduced.

Tsunami and MoU Helsinki

Despite the devastating effect of the Tsunami to both Gol and GAM, conflict levels raised again in 2005 where 108 incidents between the Indonesian military and GAM military faction were reported and led to the death of 178 people and injured another 170. The majority of incidents were concentrated in four 'hot spots': North Aceh, South Aceh, East Aceh and Bireunⁱⁱⁱ. Although the conflict had moved to the western area, especially in Southern Aceh as GAM was trying to seek support and aid, the whole province was affected by the conflict. Humanitarian workers found that the conflicting parties added to difficulties in helping the Tsunami's victims^{iv} and there was growing concern that the post Tsunami reconstruction effort would not be effective if the conflict was not resolved. The Tsunami served as 'blessing in disguise' because it drew a major amount of aid that would not be distributed unless peace was present^v. Not less than 120 international NGOs, 430 local NGOs, tens of bilateral and multilateral donors engaged in post tsunami reconstruction and committed US\$ 8-9 billion dollars for Aceh^{vi}.

Following several talks facilitated by Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), an international NGO led by former Finland President Martti Ahtisaari, Gol and GAM signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki in August 2005. The MoU was so revolutionary that the military were concerned that it would only take two more steps for Aceh to be free from Indonesia. Among the important contents were:

GAM

- Acknowledge the unitary state of Indonesian Republic (NKRI)
- Agree to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate into society

Gol

- Amnesty for GAM
- Release GAM's prisoners
- Support the reintegration of GAM and conflict victims.
- Resolve the human rights cases by establishing a human rights court and truth commission, as well as creating the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) that will serve as the basis of Aceh's future democracy and development.
- Activate Aceh's independent religious body that was previously forced to merge into the government body.

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), a combined European Union and ASEAN mission, was established to monitor and support the peace process (their mandate was completed on December 15 2005). To enhance confidence building measure between Gol and GAM, AMM created a fortnightly forum called CoSA (Commission on Security Arrangement) where both parties discussed and try to solve security issues. To handle conflict at a lower level, AMM created a mini district CoSA involving local authority and public figures.

Gol gave amnesty to 2000 GAM political prisoners, in which 298 were released in August 17, 2005 and the rest were released on August 31, 2005. Gol refused to

release those who had been imprisoned for criminal action, and GAM argued that many of their members had been imprisoned with a criminal charge when the police could not prove their connection to GAM. To facilitate the debate, AMM invited an internationally experienced Swedish-jurist who then determined the cases.^{vii}

The Indonesian Board for National Development Planning (Bappenas), the government body in charge of the implementation of the MoU, recognised three priorities along with the impact:

- Socialization of the MoU,
- Redeployment that would create a vacuum in local security
- The core reintegration package in short, medium and long term to give a peace dividend for the ex-combatant.

The list of priorities resulted in a dilemma, because the government lacked the capacity to deliver such a program.

Decommissioning and Redeployment

The decommissioning activities were divided into four terms from September to December 2005. GAM were obliged to return 840 weapons and GoI needed to withdraw all non-organic TNI and Polri personnel and leave only 14,700 TNI and 9,100 police personnel. GoI formally witnessed the acceptance and destruction of the weapons and in all, GAM handed over 1,801 weapons from which 840 were accepted by AMM; and GoI withdrew 25,890 TNI and 5,791 Polri personnel. Only 0.25 weapons were returned per combatant^{viii}. The decommissioning was concluded in December 2005.

Despite the success story, militia widely known as Peta (the homeland defender), were not included in the disarmament process. It is calculated that they consist of approximately 22 groups with a total of 200,000 members in Aceh. These groups emerged as a response to the kidnapping and tax collecting by GAM, and have been supported by the security apparatus. They had participated actively in military operations during martial law and spoiled the peace by attacking the Joint Security Council office during the CoHA time (2002).

Demobilisation

One week after the decommissioning concluded, GAM officially dismissed its military wing Teuntara Neugara Aceh (TNA) and created Aceh Transformation Commission (KPA, Komisi Peralihan Aceh) to safeguard the process of civilianisation of their combatants. However, KPA persistently followed the former TNA structure under the command of Muzakkir Manaf. GAM formed a new national board, lead by Usman Lampoh Awe, as the ultimate body to decide on future action, including preparation steps to welcome a gubernatorial election in Aceh in December 2006. GAM is expected to change into a local political party (expected to be completed in 2007) and participate in the 2009 election.

Although GAM had dismissed their military wings, they still maintain the chain of command and hold control over reintegration aids. GAM refused to give away 3000 names of their military wings (according to the MoU), afraid that TNI would use it as a 'hitlist'. Channelling aid through GAM's chain of command has created some new problems, for example, GAM members do not receive the same amount of money as the Gol had given. Previously, GAM leaders had stated that GAM will expand the distribution of the money because it has an obligation to widows and orphans of their members. An ICG report said that there is a possibility that some of the aid will be used for the organisation since GAM can no longer take *nanggroe* tax from people. Although World Bank research cannot find evidence of corruption, the lack of transparency concerns Gol and donors. Recently GAM agreed to start handing over their list of names to facilitate the distribution of aid.

Reintegration

For reintegration purposes, Gol have provided cash for short term and multi-sector programmes in the medium and long term. The NAD government created the Aceh Reintegration Body (BRA) on February 15, 2006, later known as BRDA (Aceh Peace Reintegration Body), and have structures both at province and district level. It consists of 3 sub bodies:

1. a joint forum;
2. an implementation body;
3. and an oversight body.

Within the joint forum and the implementation body GAM, NGOs, religious leaders, intellectuals and government have their representatives. On March 23 2006, BRA distributed cash support for conflict victims, ex GAM and ex political prisoners. In April, BRA and international donors prepared a data collection project for aid distribution to civilian conflict victims and community-based compensation programmes started in August.

After a Peta leader entered BRDA, GAM withdrew their representatives in June 2006 and NGOs also pulled out their member from the implementing body, but still maintained a presence in the joint forum. The NGOs representative said that they are rarely invited to the meetings and BRA is lacking in vision for the reintegration program.

A World Bank report released in December 2006 underlines some important points. The reintegration process has been running smoothly without much impediment - about 80% of active GAM combatant have returned to their villages in two months after the MoU. In several cases the local villagers have welcomed their return with a traditional ceremony *peusijuk* but in other areas, people are afraid of GAM and some militia have left their homes to avoid further conflict. However, the ex GAM and conflict victims now feel that their problem is no longer conflict with TNI or militia, but how to earn a living.

The progress of reintegration is perhaps best seen from GAM's recent participation in gubernatorial and major elections. Although GAM's candidates participated as

independent candidates due to an organisation policy not to support any candidates, two of GAM's candidates, Irwandi and Muhammad Nazar, have won an election by more than 38%. It is hoped that GAM will continue transforming their 'bullets into ballots'.

The Challenge

The First challenge is to increase the police capacity and professionalism in providing security. GAM decommissioning and TNI/Polri redeployment made a significant impact in reducing the level of armed conflict. Some arms related incidents still remain, but the majority are linked to weapon misuse by a TNI/Polri individual. Illegal tax is still enforced on a small scale by both GAM member and TNI/Polri. As AMM completed the mission and departed in December 2006, GoI and GAM need to continue using the existing mechanism (CoSA and DCoSA) to solve disputes. Presently, the most concerning fact is that the vertical conflict between GAM and GoI has been replaced by horizontal conflict at a local level - the source of the conflict ranges from disputes over land and natural resources, violence brought about by militia, administrative issues and debates over targets, and distribution and precondition of Tsunami aid. Ten months after the MoU, armed crime, terror and intimidation have decreased by 91%. However, crimes such as stealing and robbery have increased radically by 378% according to an NAD police Chief^{ix}.

The Second challenge is how to increase local government capacity to cater the DDR Programme with Post Tsunami Reconstruction in Aceh. The poor performance of BRA has been raising anxiety within the community, GAM and conflict victims. From all of the proposals that the BRA accepted, only 12% came into reality^x. Instead of pioneering the execution of the reintegration program, BRA has been performing more as a bank that struggles with proposals and dissemination of funds. Recently, the number of unemployed ex GAM has reached 74.9%^{xi}. The reconstruction and rehabilitation body for Aceh and Nias (BRR) has been criticised for their slow progress and allegation of corruption. Oxfam (UK) calculates that 70,000 people still live in temporary refugee barracks, whilst 25,000 families have not been given the houses that they were promised^{xii}. Tsunami victims complain about how GAM received support faster than most of them, while GAM and conflict victims complain about GoI's slowness in supporting reintegration. In 2005-2006, Aceh received not less than Rp28.4 trillion but poor people increased to 1.6 million or 41.5% from the total population (average in Indonesia 16.8%). The problem is not about the funds, but the capacity to channel the funds, and the fact that there is a lack of political will to eradicate corruption.

The Third challenge, recently the Indonesian Constitution Supreme Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK) omitted the Law on Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This means there is only one way left to solve past human rights violation cases: an ad hoc human rights court. The Aceh NGO coalition stated that there are 14,851 cases that have taken place since the military operation in 1989 to 2006 - it is important to solve these cases especially as IOM-Harvard-University of Syiah Kuala Aceh research in 2006 revealed that the psychological condition of the Aceh people in high intensity conflict

areas is as appalling as people in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Without truth and justice, it is difficult to guarantee a successful reintegration.

Questions

1. Ideally, a DDR programme is encompassed by several principles: political will, planning, ownership, administration and resources^{xiii}. What do you think is the problems in applying those principles in Aceh ?
2. Discuss the challenges of the reintegration processes; identify alternative actors in Aceh that can help to break through the stagnancy in the reintegration process after AMM's departure.
3. Discuss how GAM's victory in Aceh's gubernatorial election will help the reintegration process.

Further research

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